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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF A UBIQUITOUS
METAVERSE AND A WEB3 FUTURE
JON M. GARON*
The future influences the present just as much as the past.
—Friedrich Nietzsche1
[T]he present agony of social isolation, the impersonality,
structurelessness, and sense of meaninglessness from which so
many people suffer are symptoms of the breakdown of the past
rather than intimations of the future.
—Alvin Toffler2
The metaverse is understood to be an immersive virtual world serving as
the locus for all forms of work, education, and entertainment experiences.
Depicted in books, movies, and games, the metaverse has the potential not just
to supplement real-world experiences but to substantially supplant them. This
Article explores the rapid emergence and evolution of the Web3 technologies
at the heart of the metaverse movement. Web3 itself is a paradigmatic shift in
internet commerce.
This Article begins by exploring the competing economic and philosophical
approaches to the future of the internet, which is being driven on one hand by
the most successful internet advertising firms (Facebook and Google) as well
as their video game competitors (Roblox, Microsoft’s Minecraft, Epic Games,
and Valve) and on the other hand by Web3 advocates focusing on
cryptocurrencies, nonfungible tokens, decentralized finance (DeFi) and
distributed autonomous organizations (DAOs). Limiting the focus on U.S. law,
this Article reviews three core areas for the development of the metaverse: the
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law. The initial
version of this paper was developed and presented at the American Bar Association Business Law
Section Cyberspace Winter Working Meeting. Special thanks to Cheryl Butzl, Ed Morse, the members
of the 2022 Winter Working Meeting, and Dan Garon. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002551 [https://perma.cc/UYT9-VWRL].
1. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS
18 (Helen Zimmern & Paul V. Cohn trans., Prometheus Books 2009) (1878) (the oft-quoted statement
is not attributable to a publisher work) (“Our destiny rules over us, even when we are not yet aware of
it; it is the future that makes laws for our to-day.”).
2. ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 395 (1980).
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regulatory environment; the transactional essentials; and the limits on
governmental intrusion into the metaverse.
The review of the regulatory environment includes state and federal
gambling laws, money transfer laws, securities laws, and regulation of unfair
and deceptive trade practices used to enforce privacy and cybersecurity
obligations. The section on transactional essentials focuses on contracts
between metaverse enterprises and their customers, antitrust and competition
restraints, copyright protections, protections of biometric data and rights of
publicity, and protections of customer speech in metaverse environments.
Finally, this Article addresses the need for the continuing evolution of the
Fourth Amendment protection from search and seizures, the third-party
doctrine limitations on reasonable expectations of privacy, and the statutory
protections under the Stored Communications Act.
This Article highlights that although these doctrinal issues are not new, the
scope of the metaverse and its potential social importance will reshape these
doctrines in sometimes unpredictable ways. Technologists, practitioners, and
regulators must be open to these shifts to appropriately develop the correct mix
of user control, industry practice, and regulatory oversight.
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METAVERSE........................................................................................ 171
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I. INTRODUCTION
The metaverse, as highlighted by the recent corporate name change of
Facebook to Meta Platforms, Inc. (Meta), owes its literary origins to Neal
Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1992) or to prior works by Verner Vinge and
William Gibson.3 The metaverse has been used in an informal manner for the
past three decades. Aspects of a metaverse are essential to world-building
games like Roblox, Minecraft, Horizon’s World, and Fortnite, to massive
multiplayer online roleplaying games like RuneScape, Final Fantasy, and
World of Warcraft, and to virtual worlds like Second Life.4 These online
environments allow users to interact with each other, to engage with computer
generated characters, and to play or perform activities using elements within
the virtual environment. To foster the interaction among participants, each
participant is represented by an avatar. The avatars may be designed to resemble
the real-world user, to be highly fanciful, or to be anything in-between. As these
examples suggest, there are already metaverses available for the public, and
“the metaverse” actually reflects a multiverse composed of different
metaverses. The term metaverse is generally used to cover the multitude of
metaverses.
Although the metaverse remains in its nascent state, it will build on the
current Web 2.0 internet. Matthew Ball has offered seven attributes that
describe the metaverse as well as the current internet: persistence; synchronous
and live interactions; the capacity for as many concurrent users as the users
demand; a stable, functioning economy; the incorporation of both digital and
physical worlds as well as operating on both open and closed platforms; being

3. See Ethan Zuckerman, Hey, Facebook, I Made a Metaverse 27 Years Ago, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/10/facebook-metaverse-wasalways-terrible/620546/ [https://perma.cc/PV5Z-9STQ] (“[Stephenson’s] vision of the metaverse
owed a debt to Vernor Vinge’s 1981 True Names and to a series of William Gibson novels from the
‘80s. Both of those authors owed a debt to Morton Heilig’s 1962 Sensorama machine, and on and on
we go, back in time to Plato’s shadows on a cave wall.”).
4. See Jon M. Garon, Playing in the Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity
Reconceptualized Through Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465, 468–70
(2008).

GARON_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

166

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:163

largely interoperable; and being “populated by ‘content’ and ‘experiences’
created and operated by an incredibly wide range of contributors.”5
One of the most important influences on the metaverse is the generation of
users ready for it. The beginning of the 2021 drumbeat for the metaverse began
with the public offering by Roblox, signaling to a generation raised in a virtual
world rather than on a Sesame Street that their time had arrived.6 As a result, a
generation of young adults have grown up using the fifteen-year-old site for
social experiences. It has hosted birthday parties,7 concerts, an egg hunt, a tiein with Gucci to celebrate the latter’s 100th anniversary, and an agreement with
Nike.8 In addition, Snapchat’s 3D Bitmoji function launched in July 2021,
allowing its 280 million daily active users to create avatars for augmented
reality.9 The Bitmoji integration provides a powerful shift in user experience.

5. Matthew Ball, The Metaverse: What it is, Where to Find it, and Who Will Build it,
MATTHEWBALL.VC
(Jan.
13,
2020),
https://www.matthewball.vc/all/themetaverse
[https://perma.cc/6P53-44AY]; see Ben Thompson, Microsoft and the Metaverse, STRATECHERY
(Nov. 9, 2021), https://stratechery.com/2021/microsoft-and-the-metaverse/ [https://perma.cc/SQ6HLJ96] (quoting Ball and noting that these attributes describe the internet as well).
6. Dean Takahashi, The DeanBeat: Roblox Public Offering is a Vote about the Metaverse,
GAMESBEAT (Mar. 5, 2021), https://venturebeat.com/2021/03/05/the-deanbeat-roblox-publicoffering-is-a-vote-about-the-metaverse/ [https://perma.cc/5V2D-L3SF]. (“Roblox, the platform for
user-generated games, will go public through a direct listing of its shares on March 10. I see its pending
success or failure as a stock as a kind of referendum on the metaverse . . . .”); Patrick Seitz, Roblox
Stock Continues Meteoric Rise on Metaverse Story, INV.’S BUS. DAILY (Nov. 19, 2021),
https://www.investors.com/news/technology/roblox-stock-continues-meteoric-rise-on-metaversestory/ [https://perma.cc/CA5Z-SYJH] (“Roblox today provides a platform for playing video games and
socializing in 3D virtual worlds. But Roblox stock is considered a play on the metaverse, a nextgeneration version of the internet.”); ERIC SHERIDAN, MICHAEL NG, LANE CZURA, ALEXANDRA
STEIGER, ALEX VEGLIANTE & KATHERINE CAMPAGNA, AMERICAS TECHNOLOGY: FRAMING THE
FUTURE OF WEB 3.0, METAVERSE EDITION 4 (Goldman Sachs Equity Rsch. ed., 2021) (“Over the past
12 months, the term Metaverse began to gain traction shortly after Roblox’s direct listing in March and
more meaningfully saw higher levels of Google Search interest during the Q3 ‘21 earnings season as
various management teams discussed elements of their business within the future Metaverse.”).
7. See Peter Allen Clark, The Metaverse Has Already Arrived. Here’s What That Actually Means,
TIME (Nov. 15, 2021), https://time.com/6116826/what-is-the-metaverse/ [https://perma.cc/WH73EFSZ] (“When Cathy Hackl’s son wanted to throw a party for his 9th birthday, he didn’t ask for favors
for his friends or themed decorations. Instead, he asked if they could hold the celebration on Roblox.”).
8. See Joe Dyton, Will Facebook or Roblox be the Master of the Metaverse?, CONNECTED REAL
ESTATE MAG. (Dec. 9, 2021), https://connectedremag.com/das-in-building-wireless/wireless/willfacebook-or-roblox-be-master-of-the-metaverse/ [https://perma.cc/D759-LP7Y].
9. See Maria Lewczyk, Snapchat Commits to the Metaverse With Launch of 3D Bitmojis,
VIRTUAL HUMANS (July 28, 2021), https://www.virtualhumans.org/article/snapchat-commits-to-themetaverse-with-launch-of-3d-bitmojis [https://perma.cc/862Z-NERP] (“Snapchat also boasts an
impressive amount of editing capabilities and augmented reality options for users, including a variety
of filters and lenses to create content with, such as the latest viral hit allowing you to turn yourself into
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“Snapchat users are three times more likely to experiment with augmented
reality (such as filters, lenses, etc.) to try on products than those who do not use
Snapchat.”10
The shift by Facebook to adopt Meta as its name and embrace virtual worlds
has received even more attention.11 That attention alone is likely sufficient to
spur additional companies to provide resources and innovations, making virtual
worlds more significant in the video game, social media, and e-commerce
sectors. As a result of this growth, there will be an increase in attention by all
other industry sectors.
The metaverse of tomorrow may not look like the virtual environments
described in Ready Player One, Tron, Avatar, or The Matrix, but it is likely to
look much more robust than the original Second Life. Advances in technology
and shifts in culture have the ability to create an environment that is different
rather than merely a faster and better-rendered version of what has gone before.
The expansion of 5G wireless connectivity and embedded “internet of things”
products have the potential to make many household devices, vehicles, and
machines become integrated into virtual worlds. Non-fungible tokens (NFTs)
and other Web3 tools can also help stabilize and protect the value of in-world
currencies and assets, an essential component of financial stability in a game or
society.
Meta has had a slew of corporate acquisitions suggesting where it sees at
least some of this growth, including “a deal to buy Within, the company cofounded by VR pioneer Chris Milk, best known for its Supernatural workout
app[;] . . . Unit 2 Games, which makes a ‘collaborative game creation platform’
called Crayta; Bigbox VR, which makes a popular game for Facebook’s Oculus
VR goggles; and Downpour Interactive, another VR game-maker.”12 Facebook
was extremely successful when it provided third-party application
a cartoon.”); see also Tyler Lacoma & Paula Beaton, What is Bitmoji? Everything You Need to Know,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/what-is-bitmoji/
[https://perma.cc/L8YR-BPAR] (“Bitmoji is an accessory app for social media platforms that people
use to create little cartoon versions of themselves, which they then use on their various social media
accounts . . . . You create an avatar of yourself and create various comics, GIFs, expressions, and
reactions that use this avatar.”).
10. Lewczyk, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Introducing Meta: A Social Technology Company, META: NEWSROOM (Oct. 28,
2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/facebook-company-is-now-meta/ [https://perma.cc/DE8F55JB]; Kevin Roose, The Metaverse Is Mark Zuckerberg’s Escape Hatch, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/technology/meta-facebook-zuckerberg.html
[https://perma.cc/RY97-GSZT]; Peter Kafka, Facebook is Quietly Buying up the Metaverse, VOX
(Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.vox.com/recode/22776461/facebook-meta-metaverse-monopoly
[https://perma.cc/P2H5-Z2LV].
12. Kafka, supra note 11.
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programming interfaces to developers in its social media environment
including Zynga, the publisher of Farmville and Words with Friends.13 Much
like Facebook’s earlier success, the use of interactive gaming signals an
aggressive expansion into the space controlled by Valve’s Steam, Epic Games,
Microsoft, and others.14
Improved goggles and the development of augmented reality glasses closer
to that of the Microsoft HoloLens rather than the Oculus Quest will improve
the user immersion.15 Haptic sensors embedded in gloves, keyboards, and a
growing list of devices and wearables will increase kinetic feedback. Increased
computing power in cell phones along with chip availability may make one’s
cell phone into an always-on replacement for desktop and laptop computers.
The expanding skill set of Siri, Google, and Alexa will create a different kind
of computer assistant. Together, these technologies will make the virtual world
as different from Pong as a laptop has evolved from an IBM Selectric
typewriter.
To truly make the leap from a game or social experiment to the digital
replacement for society’s virus-infected meat space, a new generation of
audiovisual input devices are needed to enable a person to switch from
presenting as an avatar to providing a live camera view relatively seamlessly.
Without cameras, a person’s real-time nonverbal communication is lost.16 It is
13. See Daniel Victor, FarmVille Shuts Down, but Practices It Instilled in Users and Developers
Live On., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/technology/ farmvillezynga-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/M2SH-UYYB] (“In early 2009, when Facebook was still
nascent in its efforts to swallow as much of the internet as possible, online games were not yet the
behemoth they would become. Then, that June, came FarmVille.”); Chris Morris, The Most Important
Friendship: Facebook and Zynga, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2013), https://www.cnbc.com/2012/05/15/themost-important-friendship-facebook-and-zynga.html [https://perma.cc/R5RZ-W4XN] (“ ‘[G]ames
from Zynga have generated the majority of our payments and other fees revenue,’ the company said.
The rest of the revenue was tied to advertising. Zynga purchases a lot of ads on Facebook to promote
its titles—and its apps generate a lot of page views . . . .”).
14. Shani Shisha, Fairness, Copyright, and Video Games: Hate the Game, Not the Player, 31
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 694, 696 (2021) (“[V]ideo games now make up the
largest entertainment market in the world by an order of magnitude.”).
15. See Jamie Feltham, HoloLens 2 Review: Ahead of Its Time, For Better And Worse, UPLOAD
(Apr. 9, 2021), https://uploadvr.com/hololens-2-review/ [https://perma.cc/6NPD-H95T] (“Unlike VR,
which is—in its current form—mostly preoccupied with games and entertainment, HoloLens 2 shows
you why AR has such remarkable potential for productivity and education. With the headset’s new
collaborative platform, Microsoft Mesh, I’m able to host meetings with other people that have genuine,
tangible advantages over web calls, social VR platforms and physical meetings.”); Will Greenwald,
Augmented Reality (AR) vs. Virtual Reality (VR): What’s the Difference?, PCMAG (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://www.pcmag.com/news/augmented-reality-ar-vs-virtual-reality-vr-whats-the-difference
[https://perma.cc/B5RV-FHYP].
16. See JUDEE K. BURGOON, VALERIE MANUSOV & LAURA K. GUERRERO, NONVERBAL
COMMUNICATION 112 (2d ed. 2021).
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already greatly diminished online, but a computer-generated avatar cannot
replicate the eye movements, breathing, double takes, and tells that inform
much of human communication.17 Although there is some nonverbal
communication through the proximity of avatars and manipulation of facial
gestures, these are far less robust than face-to-face communications or
communications through live video communications.18
If a combination of camera and augmented reality glasses were used instead
of virtual reality (VR) goggles, however, the transition can be largely
accomplished. Wearable haptic sensors could further enhance the nonverbal
cues a person communicates to those on the other side of the conversations.19
This is not the only possible solution. Cameras can also be used to map a user’s
live facial movement onto an avatar or digitally rendered image. Photorealistic
avatars could create the illusion of being on camera when in fact, the person is
wearing a VR headset that does not show inside the virtual world.20
Technological improvements such as those listed above are necessary but
not sufficient for the creation of a fully realized metaverse. The other aspect of
the change must come from social readiness, demand, and predisposition for

17. See Fatik Baran Mandal, Nonverbal Communication in Humans, 24 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC.
ENV’T, 417, 417–18 (2014) DOI: 10.1080/10911359.2013.831288 [https://perma.cc/56DQ-R4UT]
(“Nonverbal behavior includes all communicative acts except speech. . . . It also includes bodily
contact, posture, physical appearance, and direction of gaze and the paralinguistic variables of
emotional tone, timing, and accent.”); Patrick W. Miller, Nonverbal Communication, in NAT’L EDUC.
ASS’N 10 (3d ed. 1988) (“Some facial expressions are readily visible, while others are so fleeting as to
go unnoticed. Both types can positively or negatively reinforce the spoken word and convey cues
concerning emotions and attitude. Next to words the human face is the primary source of information
for determining an individual’s internal feelings.”) (citations omitted).
18. Cf. Masanori Takano & Takaaki Tsunoda, Self-Disclosure of Bullying Experiences and
Social Support in Avatar Communication: Analysis of Verbal and Nonverbal Communications, 13
PROCS. OF THE THIRTEENTH INT’L AAAI CONF. ON WEB AND SOC. MEDIA 473, 474 (2019),
https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/ICWSM/article/download/3353/3221 [https://perma.cc/ZTK7-PPHA]
(“Nonverbal communication is also important for self-disclosure and social support. Especially, avatar
communication, where people with virtual bodies can show facial expressions and gestures in virtual
space, allows us to nonverbally interact through the Internet. . . .”) (citations omitted).
19. Earlier studies focused on the movement of avatars within virtual worlds. See Smiljana
Antonijevic, From Text to Gesture Online: A Microethnographic Analysis of Nonverbal
Communication in the Second Life Virtual Environment, 11 INFO. COMMC’N. & SOC’Y, 221, 225–27
(2008), https://doi.org/10.1080/13691180801937290 [https://perma.cc/W9GD-7K9Q].
20. See, e.g., Adi Robertson, Facebook Can Project Your Eyes Onto a VR Headset, and It’s
Exactly
as
Uncanny
as
it
Sounds,
VERGE
(Aug.
4,
2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/4/22609564/facebook-reality-lab-reverse-passthrough-vrprototype-research-siggraph [https://perma.cc/EMY4-YT3Q] (“Facebook Reality Labs . . . released a
paper on ‘reverse passthrough VR,’ a recipe for making VR headsets less physically isolating . . . .
‘Passthrough VR’ refers to a feature that displays a live video feed from a headset’s cameras, letting
users see the real world while they’re still wearing the device.”).
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use. Again, there are strong indicators that those changes are coming. The
massive expansion of online gaming has led to a cultural shift among the
millions who spend time in these environments, such as “(1) competitive
integrity, (2) wealth sharing, and (3) labor.”21 Despite the overwhelming
success of gaming, however, the metaverse will be built on more.
Expansion of at-home work accommodations and at-home educational
environments makes use of Zoom, Slack, Teams, Canvas, and similar
interactive environments a core part of one’s work and learning environment.
Separating work or school from play environments may no longer be
accomplished using physical spaces. At-home workers and students have
enjoyed needing to only dress the half of their bodies in view to the camera.
Privacy concerns have led many users to create virtual backgrounds. Highquality digital imagery could easily replace our live heads with photorealistic
animated headshots that do not need makeup, clothing, or lighting to make us
look professionally present in classes and meetings. Populating our meetings
with photorealistic avatars could have a transformative effect. Standardizing
use of nonrepresentational avatars could also help organizations and
communities deal with implicit biases involving race, gender, and sexual
identity. After all, if “[o]n the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog”22 applies
to the metaverse, then perhaps there is some truth to the statement that “I don’t
see breed.” This is not to suggest that all these things will come to pass or that
they will all occur in the same virtual world. But they highlight the potential for
a change in kind rather than degree with a fully realized metaverse.23
Over the course of the next months or years, most of these technological
innovations will be possible. Which of these changes will be successful will
turn on a number of factors, most of which will depend on the public’s
perception of the innovation rather than any technological merit.24 Given the
continued expansion of the video gaming industry, the societal impact of social
media, and the shift to technology-mediated work and learning environments,
however, it is a reasonable expectation that some of these shifts will take place,

21. Shisha, supra note 14, at 700.
22. Glenn Fleishman, Cartoon Captures Spirit of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/technology/cartoon-captures-spirit-of-the-internet.html
[https://perma.cc/ARN5-6SBV] (describing the most popular cartoon licensed by The New Yorker
magazine).
23. See, e.g., Kenneth Rapoza, Why you Absolutely Must Invest in the Metaverse, FORBES (Nov.
14, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2021/11/14/why-you-absolutely-must-invest-inthe-metaverse/?sh=5a0e4f23a9b0 [https://perma.cc/4MWP-3ELF].
24. See, e.g., Lee Smith & Darienne L. Dennis, Sony Battles Back, FORTUNE (May 19, 2013)
https://fortune.com/2013/05/19/sony-battles-back-fortune-1985/ [https://perma.cc/RAE6-BPV8]
(republication of article from 1985).
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creating new markets worth billions of dollars and triggering significant legal,
business, and regulatory issues.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF WEB3 AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL BATTLE FOR THE
METAVERSE
While this Article suggests a regulatory regime within an interoperable,
ever-present metaverse, it will not be the only model to emerge. There are three
primary reasons that what will emerge will be a multiverse, a loose
confederation of distinct virtual worlds and metaverse environments. The
multiverse will be an international, partially interoperable array of metaverses,
each subject to a different mix of state authority, corporate oversight, and
participatory governance.25
The first reason that a single metaverse will not provide a common global
experience is the unique set of positive law and social norms in each country or
region.26 The governance of the internet and operation of domestic law varies
considerably from country to country, and the metaverse will exacerbate rather
than flatten this trend.27 Freedom House reports, “Authorities in at least 48
countries pursued new rules for tech companies on content, data, or competition

25. The geopolitical and military consequences of the multiverse are beyond the scope of this
Article. I have begun an exploration of this topic in a separate series of articles. See generally Jon M.
Garon, When AI Goes to War: Corporate Accountability for Virtual Mass Disinformation, Algorithmic
Atrocities, and Synthetic Propaganda, 49 N. KY. L. REV. 181 (2022); Jon M. Garon, The Empires
Strike Back: Reassertion of Territorial Regulation in Cyberspace, 3 J.L. & TECH. TEX. 1 (2019); Jon
M. Garon, Cyber-World War III: Origins, 7 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1 (2018).
26. See ADRIAN SHAHBAZ & ALLIE FUNK, FREEDOM ON THE NET: THE GLOBAL DRIVE TO
CONTROL BIG TECH, FREEDOM HOUSE 1–2 (2021), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomnet/2021/global-drive-control-big-tech [https://perma.cc/3UAZ-M9B9]; William D. Eggers, Mike
Turley, & Pankaj Kamleshkumar Kishnani, The Future of Regulation, DELOITTE (June 19, 2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/future-of-regulation/regulatingemerging-technology.html [https://perma.cc/ZM4E-9BEW] (“The assumption that regulations can be
crafted slowly and deliberately, and then remain in place, unchanged, for long periods of time, has
been upended. . . . [G]overnment agencies are challenged with creating or modifying regulations,
enforcing them, and communicating them to the public at a previously undreamed-of pace.”).
27. See, e.g., Mary Hui, China is Eyeing the Metaverse as the Next Internet Battleground,
QUARTZ (Nov. 17, 2021), https://qz.com/2089316/china-sees-the-metaverse-as-the-next-internetbattleground/ [https://perma.cc/5GBE-9QFL].
[A Chinese Government book] sketches out six major trends of the metaverse.
Among them: the deep integration of the digital and real economy; data becoming
a core asset; and the globalization of digital and decentralized finance, or DeFi.
Those trends map neatly onto China’s stated strategic goals for its internet
industry and more broadly, the digital economy. The government regards data as
a factor of production, and has erected a new legal infrastructure to ensure
sweeping control over tech firms’ data.
Id.
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over the past year.”28 The U.S. regulatory model is very different from that of
Europe, and even more different from the governmental control exercised in
China, Russia, and by other authoritarian regimes.29
Secondly, the development of the metaverse or expanded metaverses comes
as part of a larger movement towards Web3, the next phase in the development
of the digital economy.30 At the heart of the Web3 movement is a philosophical
goal of decentralized and democratized control of the internet instead of control
vesting in an oligarchic set of interdependent multinational corporations or
traditional superpowers.31 For some activities, the importance of Web3
communities and autonomy from corporate governance will drive adoption
decisions. In others, the requirements of legal compliance, the importance of
contractual relationships, and a risk-averse management strategy will require
participation in only those aspects of the metaverse that are backed by
established industry leaders that can assure compliance with regulatory
requirements and product safety standards.32
Thirdly, as the adage notes, “The future is already here. It’s just not evenly
distributed yet.”33 By 2015, the importance of digital property had become so
significant that the Uniform Law Commission, in partnership with the
American Law Institute, adopted the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to
28. SHAHBAZ & FUNK, supra note 26, at 1.
29. Id. (“China ranks as the worst environment for internet freedom for the seventh year in a
row. Chinese authorities imposed draconian prison terms for online dissent, independent reporting, and
mundane daily communications.”).
30. See Ephrat Livni, Welcome to “Web3.” What’s That?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/05/business/dealbook/what-is-web3.html [https://perma.cc/Z3JJU9AF].
31. See id.
32. This approach of risk-averse contractual partnerships was famously captured in the adage
“nobody gets fired for buying IBM,” a strategy that left many companies unable to pivot to the PC
revolution and emergence of the internet. See Duena Blomstrom, “Nobody Gets Fired for Buying
IBM.” But They Should., FORBES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/duenablomstrom1
/2018/11/30/nobody-gets-fired-for-buying-ibm-but-they-should [https://perma.cc/7GE8-498V]; Scott
Kirsner, The Barriers Big Companies Face When They Try to Act Like Lean Startups, HARV. BUS.
REV. ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-barriers-big-companies-face-when-theytry-to-act-like-lean-startups [https://perma.cc/7JX8-4739].
33. Quote generally attributed to William Gibson. See Pagan Kennedy, William Gibson’s Future
Is Now, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/books/review/distrust-thatparticular-flavor-by-william-gibson-book-review.html [https://perma.cc/DNN4-R224] (“[T]his quote
is often attributed to Gibson, though no one seems to be able to pin down when or if he actually said
it. Still, it neatly sums up his own particular flavor.”); see also The Future Has Arrived — It’s Just Not
Evenly
Distributed
Yet,
QUOTE
INVESTIGATOR
(Jan.
24,
2012),
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/01/24/future-has-arrived/
[https://perma.cc/CH9K-ZLX4]
(providing an outline of the evolution of the quote with attribution to Gibson and a nod to Marshall
McLuhan and Alvin Toffler).
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Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA).34 RUFADAA provides legal authority for an
executor, fiduciary, or lawyer to access the account of someone who has died
or become incapacitated to properly oversee the person’s digital assets.35 The
law has since been adopted in all but four states, highlighting the growth in
importance of digital assets.36 As this change demonstrates, there is already too
much invested in digital assets to expect that a new system will wholly or
painlessly supplant what has already been adopted.
The past history of virtual worlds provides another example of the highly
variable experiences to be expected. The virtual worlds of a prior decade did
not actually vanish, they merely dropped out of the headlines. “Virtual reality
never really left. It just shifted focus from entertainment to fields like medicine
and military training.”37 The statistics for virtual worlds help provide a strong
reminder that even small niche uses are significant. According to market
research firm Omdia, “[I]n 2021, 12.5 million headsets will be sold, while
spend on VR content will reach $2 [billion].”38 Other reports are considerably
higher, but the more moderate calculations are likely more accurate.39
Beyond the public interest in various tools, technologies, investments, and
pastimes, there are also profound structural barriers that benefit some adopters
of technology over others. “The idea of the ‘digital divide’ refers to the growing
gap between the underprivileged members of society . . . .”40 One simple
example highlights the problem. “As more than 55 million students moved to
online learning during the pandemic, one in five teens, ages 13 to 17, reported
being unable to do their homework ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ because of unreliable
34. See FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT, REVISED (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2018)
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=f7237fc4-74c2-472881c6-b39a91ecdf22 [https://perma.cc/BDG4-U7SU].
35. Id.; see S. Dresden Brunner, Access to Digital Assets—Florida’s New Law for Fiduciaries:
What Are Digital Assets and Why Are They Relevant?, FL. BAR J., Nov. 2016, at 34, 34–35,
https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/access-to-digital-assets-floridas-new-law-forfiduciaries-what-are-digital-assets-and-why-are-they-relevant/
[https://perma.cc/K4R3-W9DA];
Patrick Hicks, What is RUFADAA - Everything You Need to Know, TRUST & WILL,
https://trustandwill.com/learn/what-is-rufadaa [https://perma.cc/J6TC-27FH].
36. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, supra note 34.
37. Ivan Stevanovic, 30 Virtual Reality Statistics for 2022, KOMMANDO TECH (May 13, 2022),
https://kommandotech.com/statistics/virtual-reality-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/J9Y3-WGEP].
38. George Jijiashvili, Omdia Research Reveals 12.5 Million Consumer VR Headsets Sold in
2021 With Content Spend Exceeding $2bn, GAME DEV. (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://www.gamedeveloper.com/blogs/omdia-research-reveals-12-5-million-consumer-vr-headsetssold-in-2021-with-content-spend-exceeding-2bn [https://perma.cc/527W-84TD].
39. Stevanovic, supra note 37 (reflecting 171 million active VR users in the world in 2018 with
a revenue of $16.8 billion).
40. Digital Divide, STANFORD UNIV., https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/
projects/digital-divide/start.html [https://perma.cc/RV92-9NPQ].
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Internet access. Twelve million children were without internet access
altogether.”41
The digital divide disadvantages the disadvantaged, exacerbating
preexisting inequities “especially [for] the poor, rural, elderly, and handicapped
portion of the population who do not have access to computers or the internet;
and the wealthy, middle-class, and young Americans living in urban and
suburban areas who have access.”42
Nearly half of Americans without at-home internet were in
Black and Hispanic households. With a 14-point gap in
broadband access between white and Black households with
school-going children, and a 12-point gap between white and
Hispanic households, we find that up to 40% of disconnected
K-12 students from Black, Latino, and indigenous
communities struggle with insufficient digital literacy,
language obstacles, and other disincentives to use the internet
and find ways to gain better access.
The digital divisions are likely to keep these historic
disadvantages in place in the future. Seventy percent of Black
and 60% of Hispanic respondents report being underprepared
with digital skills, affecting their employability. While a third
of all white workers in 2018 were in jobs they could do from
home, less than 20% percent of Black workers and only 16%
percent of Hispanic workers were in jobs that could be done
remotely.43
The internal divides of race, poverty, and geography mean that the future
development of society-changing technologies risk further reinforcing a
technological caste system based on wealth, race, culture, and geography both
within the U.S. and among the nations of the world. These divisions are innately
inequitable for those left without access to the opportunities made uniquely
through the metaverse, and they will be exploited by adversaries of the U.S. to
further an anti-American narrative that paints democratic ideals as mere
manipulation and propaganda.44 For each of these three reasons, any future
41. Bhaskar Chakravorti, How to Close the Digital Divide in the U.S., HARV. BUS. R. ONLINE
(July
20,
2021),
https://hbr.org/2021/07/how-to-close-the-digital-divide-in-the-u-s
[https://perma.cc/34KT-RC9H].
42. STANFORD UNIVERSITY, supra note 40.
43. Chakravorti, supra note 41.
44. See Peter Rudolph, The Sino-American World Conflict, in SWP RESEARCH PAPER 4,
STRATEGIC RIVALRY BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CHINA 10 (Barbara Lippert & Volker Perthes
eds., 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/strategic-rivalry-between-united-states-andchina [https://perma.cc/V3KB-XZ5L] (“[T]he systemic conflict will loom increasingly large on the
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expectations of Web3 and the metaverse must take the global competition, the
varying regulatory models, and the internal inequities into account.
III. WEB3, NFTS, AND DAOS
Within the context of these three challenges, the evolution of Web3 will be
particularly important to assess as it evolves over time. According to advocates
of a decentralized, token-centric model of internet engagement, Web3 “will
democratize everything, reshaping art, commerce and technology; displacing
intermediaries; and putting people more directly in control of their destinies.”45
Web3 differs from Web 1.0 and Web 2.0, according to analysts, in the
nature of both the content and interactivity. Although the internet has been in
existence since the 1970s, the modern World Wide Web or Web 1.0 was tied
directly to the launch of the graphical user interface beginning with the Mozilla
(Netscape) web browser in 1994.46 In many ways, the internet of the 1990s was
a digital publisher and library, dominated by content owners digitizing,
organizing, and pushing out content to the public in a one-to-many model.47
Web 2.0 was about interactivity and user generated content. “Web 2.0 refers to
worldwide websites which highlight user-generated content, usability, and

American side, sometimes interpreted as a clash between ‘liberal democracy’ and what is occasionally
referred to as ‘digital authoritarianism’. Highlighting the ideological conflict might be employed to
mobilise sustained domestic support for a power clash with China. . . .”); EUGENE RUMER & RICHARD
SOKOLSKY, THIRTY YEARS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA: CAN THE VICIOUS CIRCLE BE
BROKEN? 2 (2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-towardrussia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323 [https://perma.cc/C6LN-V7HV] (“Russian leaders see
their country as a great power in charge of its own destiny. . . . [T]hey reject democracy promotion as
a cover for U.S.-sponsored regime change; they . . . will resist perceived U.S. intrusions; and they rely
on anti-Americanism to legitimize their unpopular policies with domestic audiences.”).
45. Livni, supra note 30.
46. See Gilad Edelman, The Father of Web3 Wants You to Trust Less, WIRED (Nov. 29, 2021),
https://www.wired.com/story/web3-gavin-wood-interview/ [https://perma.cc/FE7V-M9KL] (“Web
1.0, the story goes, was the era of decentralized, open protocols, in which most online activity involved
navigating to individual static webpages.”). Netscape launched in October 1994 as Mozilla and set
most of the industry standards. What Was the First Web Browser?, STARRY (June 19, 2019),
https://starry.com/blog/inside-the-internet/what-was-the-first-web-browser [https://perma.cc/C7BP9MMH]. Tim Berners-Lee created an earlier browser in 1990. Marc Andreessen and Jamie Zawinski
developed the NCSA Mosaic web browser in 1993, which became Microsoft’s Internet Explorer in
1995. Id.
47. See Nupur Choudhury, World Wide Web and Its Journey from Web 1.0 to Web 4.0, 5 INT’L
J. COMPUT. SCI. & INFO. TECH. 8096, 8096 (2014).
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interoperability for end users. Web 2.0 is also called the participative social
web.”48
The generation implementing Web 1.0 started with Pong. Each node on the
internet helped realize a vision of the future fostered by Star Trek.49 America
Online and the Yahoo! portal were groundbreaking in their day.50 Then, with
Web 2.0, the editorial power of the portals and their media-giant parent
companies was disintermediated by Google’s search engine and the explosion
of many-to-many content that put the user’s voice at the center of the media
feed.51
For advocates of Web3, Web 2.0 shifted from its participatory roots into a
centralized, algorithmically mediated new media marketplace.52 The

48. Comparison Between Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and Web 3.0, GEEKSFORGEEKS (Aug. 2, 2022),
https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/web-1-0-web-2-0-and-web-3-0-with-their-difference/
[https://perma.cc/47RW-5FZZ]; see Susannah Fox & Mary Madden, Riding the Waves of “Web 2.0,”
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2006), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2006/10/05/riding-the-wavesof-web-2-0/ [https://perma.cc/S9T5-2UB4] (“[Web 2.0] provided a useful, if imperfect, conceptual
umbrella under which analysts, marketers and other stakeholders in the tech field could huddle the new
generation of internet applications and businesses that were emerging to form the ‘participatory Web’
as we know it today: Think blogs, wikis, social networking, etc.”).
49. See Teena Maddox, Tech Leaders Share How Star Trek Inspired Them to Pursue a Career
in Technology, TECH REPUBLIC (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/tech-leadersshare-how-star-trek-inspired-them-to-pursue-a-career-in-technology/ [https://perma.cc/B9PX-3RTE].
50. See Edmund Lee & Lauren Hirsch, Fortunes of AOL and Yahoo Change Again in a $5 Billion
Sale, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2021, at B5 (“Yahoo and AOL, kings of the early internet, saw their fortunes
decline as Silicon Valley raced ahead to create new digital platforms. Google replaced Yahoo. AOL
was supplanted by cable giants.”).
51. See Paul Miller, Web 2.0: Building the New Library, ARIADNE (Oct. 30, 2005),
http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue/45/miller/ [https://perma.cc/MA8H-ND43]; Scott Karp, What
Magazines Still Don’t Understand About The Web, PUBLISHING 2.0 (June 9, 2008),
https://publishing2.scottkarp.ai/2008/06/09/what-magazines-still-dont-understand-about-the-web/
[https://perma.cc/GWG4-NMQS]; Choudhury, supra note 47, at 8099.
52. See, e.g., Kevin Curran, Netflix No Longer Fits in FAANG, But Here’s Who Does,
THESTREET (June 7, 2021), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/netflix-no-longer-fits-in-faangheres-who-does [https://perma.cc/ACY7-JETB] (“Nearly a decade ago, TheStreet’s founder Jim
Cramer coined the acronym FANG, later updated to FAANG, for companies supremely dominant in
their respective markets and their stocks’ resulting proclivity for outperformance.”); Lara O’Reilly,
The 30 Biggest Media Companies in the World, BUS. INSIDER (May 31, 2016),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-30-biggest-media-owners-in-the-world-2016-5
[https://perma.cc/DAE5-TFKN] (“Digital giants are increasingly dominating the global advertising
market. In 2015, Google, Facebook, Baidu, Yahoo, and Microsoft accounted for 19% of all the global
ad spend flowing through all media, according to media agency ZenithOptimedia’s 2016 ‘Top Thirty
Global Media Owners’ report.”); Florian Saurwein & Charlotte Spencer‐Smith, Automated Trouble:
The Role of Algorithmic Selection in Harms on Social Media Platforms, 9 MEDIA & COMM. 222, 222
(2021)
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/4062
[https://perma.cc/2ZCU-LYWB].
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dominance of the FAANG companies—Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix,
and Google—largely undermine the ethos of Web 2.0 as being about individual
participation. While Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, Twitter, and others are about
user content, the role of algorithms to manage what one sees, and the dominance
of the platforms, make the internet feel very ownership centric. Naval Ravikant
tweeted, “Web 2: Users are the data, corporations own the platform, and the
code is closed. Web 3: Users own their data, contributors own the platform, and
the code is open.”53
“Web 2.0, which we’re living through now, is the era of centralization, in
which a huge share of communication and commerce takes place on closed
platforms owned by a handful of super-powerful corporations—think Google,
Facebook, Amazon—subject to the nominal control of centralized government
regulators.”54 Combined with powerful centralized control enforced through the
terms of service, Web 2.0 is publicly perceived as a digital industrial age
dominated by massive multinational corporations.55 Even though more than
80% of the public uses YouTube and nearly 70% of the public uses Facebook,
the era is known for the corporate management of public content rather than the

Evidence of harms involving social media algorithms was collected from media
reports and academic papers within a two‐year timeframe from 2018 to 2019,
covering Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter. Harms with similar casual
mechanisms were grouped together to inductively develop a typology of
algorithmic harm based on the mechanisms involved in their emergence: (1)
algorithmic errors, undesirable, or disturbing selections; (2) manipulation by
users to achieve algorithmic outputs to harass other users or disrupt public
discourse; (3) algorithmic reinforcement of pre‐existing harms and inequalities in
society; (4) enablement of harmful practices that are opaque and discriminatory;
and (5) strengthening of platform power over users, markets, and society.
Id.
53. Naval
Ravikant
(@naval),
TWITTER
(Oct.
12,
2021,
7:52
PM),
https://twitter.com/naval/status/1448089151677603846 [https://perma.cc/BDQ9-VN86].
54. Edelman, supra note 46.
55. See, e.g., In Song Kim & Helen v. Milner, Multinational Corporations and their Inﬂuence
Through Lobbying on Foreign Policy 8–9 (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Kim_Milner_manuscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3Y5-U5P6] (“[R]esearch
on business political activity is that large ﬁrms lobby the most. . . . Moreover, larger ﬁrms utilize their
resources to actually spend more. . . . The biggest ﬁrms are also able to leverage considerable
informational advantages . . . which help to reduce uncertainty for policymakers.”) (citations omitted);
Global
Implications
of
Media
and
Technology,
LUMEN
LEARNING,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/sociology/chapter/global-implications-of-media-and-technology/
[https://perma.cc/DT4S-YR53] (“On the surface, there is endless opportunity to find diverse media
outlets. But the numbers are misleading. . . . In 1983, a mere 50 corporations owned the bulk of massmedia outlets. Today in the United States . . . just five companies control 90 percent of media
outlets.”) (citation omitted).
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decentralized nature of media.56 Despite the participation by the public, Web
2.0 revenue is driven by advertising.57
Web3, its evangelists predict, will use the power of digital property to
empower the individual.58 “For Web3, the internet is shifting from ad-based
business models to commerce-based business models. . . . As the internet
evolves, it becomes more participatory. People move from passive consumers
to active creators.”59 Gavin Wood, founder of the Web3 Foundation, has been
quoted as explaining, “Web3 is actually much more of a larger sociopolitical
movement that is moving away from arbitrary authorities into a much more
rationally based liberal model. And this is the only way I can see of
safeguarding the liberal world . . . .”60
The question remains whether this vision is different than the vision of
earlier Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 advocates regarding their model of an internet.61
John Perry Barlow chided the “Governments of the Industrial World” that
“[y]ou claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. . . . Many of
these problems don’t exist.”62 The earlier utopian idea failed and created a
vacuum into which U.S. corporations were able to bestride the narrow world,
each like a mighty colossus.63
56. Brooke Auxier & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7,
2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/
[https://perma.cc/65H7-5D8X] (reporting that 81% of Americans use YouTube and 69% use
Facebook).
57. Rex Woodbury, Chain Reactions: How Creators, Web3, and the Metaverse Intersect, DIGIT.
NATIVE (May 5, 2021), https://digitalnative.substack.com/p/chain-reactions-how-creators-web3
[https://perma.cc/KQU4-FQA6] (“Most big Web1 and Web2 companies make money through
advertising.”).
58. See Edelman, supra note 46 (“Gavin Wood coined the term Web3 (originally Web 3.0) in
2014. At the time, he was fresh off of helping develop Ethereum, the cryptocurrency that is second
only to Bitcoin in prominence and market size.”).
59. Woodbury, supra note 57 (emphasis in the original).
60. Edelman, supra note 46.
61. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/KS7UBFGM] (“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone.”).
62. Id.
63. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, l. 136–42.
CASSIUS
Why, man, he spans this narrow world
like the Colossus, and we puny men
Walk under his huge legs, and peep about
To find ourselves dishonorable graves.
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Like the earlier generation of anti-regulators, the current Web3 enthusiasts
tend to ignore both the nature of the people who actively used the technologies
and the people left without access to its benefits. But the increasingly lower
barriers to entry for creation and economic opportunity in the Web3 economy
should at least reduce these disparities.64
Moreover, at the same time there is a strong diffusion of wealth and power
away from the U.S. In 2012, the National Intelligence Council published a
global trend analysis to review the likely shifts in the coming two decades.65
The report provided some prescient scenarios of the world of 2030:
In the most plausible worst-case scenario, the risks of
interstate conflict increase. The U.S. draws inward and
globalization stalls.
....
Inequalities explode as some countries become big winners
and others fail. Inequalities within countries increase social
tensions. Without completely disengaging, the U.S. is no
longer the “global policeman.”
Driven by new technologies, nonstate actors take the lead
in confronting global challenges.66
Reading the predictions at their halfway point, the first two predictions have
come to pass, leading advocates for Web3 to embrace nonstate actors as a
solution. Evangelists for Web3 point out that these changes are already
occurring. There is over $2.3 trillion in value that has accrued in the thousands
of cryptocurrencies that have emerged in the past five years.67 This
demonstrates a tremendous global demand for non-fiat currencies. That demand
may also reflect the interest by some asset holders of their need to move out of

Men at some time are masters of their fates.
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
Id.
64. See Woodbury, supra note 57 (“More broadly, it’s easier than ever to build companies.
Amazon Web Services and Stripe are Lego-like building blocks that make it fast and easy to launch a
business. Software is becoming more accessible to use, allowing anyone to be a creator entrepreneur.”).
65. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS i
(2012), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf [https://perma.cc/SP45-HK3D].
66. Id. at ii.
67. Livni, supra note 30 (“At the start of 2020, a Bitcoin was worth just over $7,000. Today, it’s
trading at about $50,000, and the value of all cryptocurrencies, of which Bitcoin is one among many,
is some $2.3 trillion.”).
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unstable economies, to avoid government regulation, or some combination of
both.68
Goldman Sachs suggests that key elements of this model will emerge. It
provides a few key principles:
[1] Likely more control by the user of their data (including data
residing on-device);
[2] Likely a more micro focus - a mean reversion on scale
(either in end market being tackled or in relationship between
the platform and the user);
[3] The rise of individual as creator & creator monetizing their
content more directly with “fans”;
[4] Increasingly decentralized (with the possible breakdown of
the mobile operating system/app store distribution model over
the next 5-10 years); &
[5] Flexibility (if not innovation) on payment mechanisms
aimed at a mix of themes, including decentralized privacy and
anti-establishment.69
These are not particularly bold predictions since they largely describe the
nascent Web3 economy of 2021. In the last few years, for example, blockchain
technologies have expanded into multiple areas beyond cryptocurrency. The
most popular expansion of blockchain technology has been through the
collection, sale, and trading of nonfungible tokens (NFTs). “So far in 2021,
about $27 billion worth of crypto has been spent on major NFT platforms,
according to Chainalysis. That’s up from $114 million in all of last year.”70
The use of NFTs creates a mechanism for digital assets to be uniquely
identified, provided a nearly unforgeable provenance, and be available for
68. See, e.g., Werner Vermaak, Afghanistan: Can Blockchain and Crypto Prevent or Mitigate
The Fallout of Failing States?, ALEXANDRIA, https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/article/
afghanistan-can-blockchain-and-crypto-prevent-or-mitigate-the-fallout-of-failing-states
[https://perma.cc/PF9J-AT36] (“El Salvador’s recent decision to adopt Bitcoin as a national currency
could improve their economy by easing money transfers from El Salvadorians abroad and providing
financial services to locals who can’t otherwise afford them. The same technology would have proved
exceedingly useful during the Taliban’s recent run on the banks.”); Cady Voge, Where Could Bitcoin
Succeed
as
a
Currency?
In
a
Failed
State,
WIRED
(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/where-could-bitcoin-succeed-as-a-currency-in-a-failed-state/
[https://perma.cc/EBS8-QULW] (“[I]n Venezuela, where inflation topped 2,616 percent last year,
cryptocurrency is a way around restrictions on holding foreign currency, and in some cases, a means
of survival.”); Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, David Manheim & Patrick B. Johnston, TERRORIST USE OF
CRYPTOCURRENCIES - TECHNICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS AND FUTURE THREATS 14
(2019) https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3026.html [https://perma.cc/7U5N-N3JE]
(“The question of whether and how terrorist organizations would use a cryptocurrency system depends
on the available technology and its properties, as well as the groups’ needs and capabilities.”).
69. SHERIDAN, supra note 6, at 3.
70. Livni, supra note 30.
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trading, largely without the need for large, centralized intermediaries.71 The
NFT is more than just simply a digital certificate of authenticity, however,
because it typically includes code that specifies conditions of ownership and
transfer. These provisions are unfortunately and inaccurately labeled “smart
contracts,”72 though they can more accurately be described as automated
provisions for digital transactions. “Smart contracts are open-sourced
blockchain protocols that directly control the transfer of digital currencies or
assets between parties under certain terms and conditions.”73 For current
internet users, NFTs provide a fundamentally new way of approaching
ownership of digital assets, since those had previously been defined by the
terms of service rather than property law.74 For those involved in Web 1.0, the
use of NFTs is quite analogous to the early efforts in copyright law to provide
digital protections measures for digital assets, micropayment systems, and other
property-oriented approaches to protect artists and individuals from corporate
overreach.75 Social trends and the digital native culture, however, may create a
different outcome in Web3 than that which occurred in Web 1.0.
We’re becoming a digital-first species, and at the same time
we’re rejecting institutions. Those two factors are combining
to make work more disaggregated and creative, fueling the

71. See Pratin Vallabhaneni, The Rise of NFTs – Opportunities and Legal Issues, WHITE & CASE
(Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/rise-nfts-opportunities-and-legalissues [https://perma.cc/8GER-DDQA] (“[A]n NFT . . . contains a unique identification code and
metadata that distinguishes one NFT from any other, and represents items on the blockchain that cannot
be replicated. . . . Moreover, NFTs are composed of software code in the form of ‘smart contracts’ that
can be crafted to provide significant benefits to NFT creators.”).
72. Quinn Dupont & Bill Maurer, Ledgers and Law in the Blockchain, KINGS REV. (June 23,
2015), https://www.kingsreview.co.uk/essays/ledgers-and-law-in-the-blockchain [https://perma.cc/
8CN5-Z3TT] (“[S]mart contracts seem to miss the whole point of contracts: that, like promises, they
are made to be broken. . . . Contracts, by contrast, are all about managing uncertainty.”). Smart
contracts are merely short code, often containing programming errors made immutable in the
blockchain. David G.W. Birch, They’re Not Smart And They’re Not Contracts, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidbirch/2021/09/04/theyre-not-smart-and-theyre-notcontacts/?sh=3b0db44a397e [https://perma.cc/7LBY-VJ34]. Companies treating the use of these
coding errors as hacking, therefore, acknowledge that the terms of the contract are likely not the same
as the code in the token. Id. “Ethereum inventor Vitalik Buterin[ ] comment[ed] that he wished that
with hindsight he had used the word ‘persistent script’ instead.” Id.
73. Vallabhaneni, supra note 71.
74. See generally JOSHUA FAIRCHILD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM (2017). Since the focus of this Article is on the metaverse, the discussion of Web3 will be
limited to its intersection with virtual world architectures. The broader implications of the Web3 will
be addressed separately.
75. See Jon M. Garon, What If DRM Fails?: Seeking Patronage in the iWasteland and the Virtual
O, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 27–30 (2008) (discussing the economic hardship on individual artists
and predicting a return to patronage systems of artistic support).
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creator economy and letting everyone build with technology.
Web3 and new business models will better allow creators and
their communities to capture and exchange value, forming
robust digital economies. Ultimately, this will lead to an
immersive, decentralized metaverse.76
The demographic shifts,77 changes in technologies, and the central role the
internet now plays in many people’s daily lives all suggest the transformation
will take place. Despite these changes, however, that does not suggest that
governments are prepared to sit back or that established enterprises are not
going to find strategies to dominate the emerging markets.
In the context of cryptocurrency, for example, each sovereign state will
determine the degree to which it is willing to have a non-fiat currency compete
with the nation’s fiat currency, the extent to which the use of the public is in
need of consumer protection regulation, and the degree to which the
marketplace for these assets must be regulated to control fraud and abuse.78 The
choices will likely vary from country to country, and they may also vary
considerably depending on the particular attributes of each cryptocurrency.
The power of the FAANG companies have led proponents of Web3 to
embrace a similar, libertarian ethos against organizational management. This
movement can best be seen in the popularity of Decentralized Autonomous
Organizations (DAOs).
DAOs . . . unlock radically new ways to organize capital and
human resources. Packy McCormick sums it up succinctly:
“DAOs are a new way to finance projects, govern communities,
and share value. Instead of a top-down hierarchical structure, they
use Web3 technology and rapidly evolving governance and
incentive systems to distribute decision-making authority and
financial rewards. Typically, they do that by issuing tokens based
on participation, contribution, and investment. Token holders then
76. Woodbury, supra note 57 (“As a 90s kid, I’ll never forget loitering in the food court with
friends . . . . The mall was the hub around which our social lives revolved. Today’s kids hang out on
Snapchat, on TikTok, in Roblox, in Fortnite. The internet is the new place to be.”).
77. See id. (“In 2010, there were 2 billion people online—about 30% of the world’s population.
Over the last decade, that’s swelled to 4.5 billion people and 60% of the world.”).
78. See
Robert
Litan,
Regulation,
LIBR.
OF
ECON.
&
LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Regulation.html [https://perma.cc/G7QT-4N3Y] (highlighting
disclosure requirements, antitrust and competition laws, safety, and taxes as the purposes of
regulation); Objectives of Market Regulation, ANALYSTPREP (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://analystprep.com/cfa-level-1-exam/equity/objectives-market-regulation/
[https://perma.cc/
JT49-967T] (“The objectives of market regulation are to control fraud, control agency problems,
promote fairness, set mutually beneficial standards, prevent undercapitalized financial firms from
making excessively risky investments, and to ensure that long-term liabilities are funded.”).
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have the ability to submit proposals, vote, and share in the
upside.”79
DAOs can be analogized to nonprofit membership organizations which
have no professional staff, to share ownership in corporations, or to labor
unions which own their companies. The DAOs will be one potential model for
governance of the metaverse—or at least some games and virtual worlds that
connect into the metaverse. It is hard not to reflect that history has attempted
this revolution before or to ignore that “[a]ll animals are equal, but some
animals are more equal than others.”80 Tokens will be meted out based on
payment, proof of work, or some other system. The attention span to provide
governance from below will not be evenly distributed. Like political
movements, some DAOs will be captured by their fringe elements. Others will
be operated by those who are most expert at gathering the resources from the
broader community. Still others are likely to be built with advantages for the
founders, much like or even stronger than the venture-capital-backed publicly
traded corporations of today. Ironically, it should not be forgotten that a stock
certificate is precisely a token of distributed ownership designed to allow
aggregation of capital, liquidity, and shared governance.
For some organizations and for particular purposes, however, the DAO may
be an appropriate operational approach.81 Just as there are nonprofits, public
benefit corporations, limited liability companies, and close corporations to
serve as alternatives to the Chapter C corporation, there will be times that DAOs
are best suited to the public’s interest in a particular cause, enterprise, or
entertainment.
For the limited purpose of addressing the metaverse, however, there is a
clear battle brewing between the centralized vision of a virtual world network
organized and managed by Meta and other FAANG companies or a series of
open-source protocols utilized through the sharing of NFTs and the smart
contract rules associated with those tokens. The existing exemplars of the
metaverse are predominantly controlled by centralized corporations and

79. Yash Bagal, How Web3 Redefines Labour, Capital, and Fandom in Music, APPETITE FOR
DISTRACTION (Dec. 6, 2021), https://yashbagal.substack.com/p/web3-daos-nfts-music-creators
[https://perma.cc/G8EP-XHQK]; see Brandon Echter, Crypto and the metaverse with Packy
McCormick of Not Boring, SOLANA (Oct. 12, 2021), https://solana.com/news/packy-mccormick-ofnot-boring-on [https://perma.cc/F6XT-RLM3] (quoting Packy McCormick, writer, NOT BORING)
(“One of the things I think crypto does well is give physical-ish characteristics to digital things, and so
I think a interface that makes that clear will have a lot of value in just making a lot of the stuff that
feels a little more ethereal feel more real and tangible. . . .”).
80. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 88 (Alfred A. Knopf Inc. ed. 1989).
81. See Dave Rodman, DAOs: A Legal Analysis, JD SUPRA (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/daos-a-legal-analysis-6177928/ [https://perma.cc/U2R9-778B].
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carefully curated. These include Roblox, Fortnite, and Microsoft’s Minecraft.82
These companies also adhere to restrictions of the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act requiring additional protections for minors under the age of
thirteen.83
In contrast, there are NFT-based metaverse projects that seek to remove
corporate ownership (or at least remove the FAANG companies from the list of
corporate owners) and replace centralized control with user-based or
community-based control. One such project is Decentraland.84 It is operated by
the Decentraland Foundation operating on behalf of the community DAO.85
Although a DAO, it has community committees, such as the “wearables
curation committee” to establish certain acceptable standards within the
community.86 Another of the significant noncentralized metaverses is
Sandbox.87 “Sandbox is a virtual world made-up of NFTs (LANDS, ASSETS,
GAMES). Meaning, users have absolute ownership of their creations and
LANDs in the Metaverse. For that reason, the Sandbox Metaverse is a
promising investment area.”88 Both Sandbox and Decentraland rely on the
Ethereum platform for their NFT operating network.89
Neither the centrally operated metaverses nor the NFT/DAO metaverses
will be able to eradicate the other, and in some areas, there may even be
82. See Yao Du, Thomas D. Grace, Krithika Jagannath & Katie Salen-Tekinbas, Connected Play
in Virtual Worlds: Communication and Control Mechanisms in Virtual Worlds for Children and
Adolescents, MULTIMODAL TECH. & INTERACTIONS May 2021, at 1, 15 (2021),
https://www.mdpi.com/2414-4088/5/5/27/pdf [https://perma.cc/P785-WQC5] (discussing parental
controls and moderation is a wide range of platforms).
83. Id. at 7–8.
84. See Alexandra Marquez, Welcome to Decentraland, Where NFTs Meet a Virtual World,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/welcome-decentraland-nftsmeet-virtual-world-rcna553 [https://perma.cc/UFW5-WYUT] (“Most everything in Decentraland is an
NFT, from its virtual plots of land to the art on the walls in the virtual galleries. Ownership also gives
users a say in how the virtual world operates.”).
85. DECENTRALAND, Terms of Use, https://decentraland.org/terms/ [https://perma.cc/5459YWHT].
86. Id.
87. See Sébastien Borget, The Sandbox (SAND): Tokenized Assets for Gaming Ecosystems,
CRYPTOPEDIA (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/the-sandbox-sand-crypto-nftvirtual-world [https://perma.cc/Z7EN-J8JM] (post by the Sandbox Co-Founder & COO) (“The
Sandbox is an Ethereum-based metaverse and gaming ecosystem where users can create, share, and
monetize in-world assets and gaming experiences. . . . The Sandbox is designed to disrupt the
traditional gaming market in which platforms own and control user-generated content whereby the
rights of creators and gamers are limited.”).
88. Melwyn Joseph, Sandbox Metaverse: Is The Sandbox Playable and Is The Sandbox An
NFT?, STEALTH OPTIONAL (Dec. 6, 2021), https://stealthoptional.com/metaverse/sandbox-metaverseis-the-sandbox-playable-and-is-the-sandbox-an-nft/ [https://perma.cc/XDT8-5MLJ].
89. Id.; DECENTRALAND, supra note 85.
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cooperation. Nonetheless, control of the metaphorical capital cities within the
metaverse and the key economic assets could well be worth trillions of dollars.
The competition between the Fortune 50 companies and newly formed DAOs
will shape the internet for the next generation.
IV. A GLIMPSE OF THE U.S. LEGAL ROADMAP
The expansion of virtual worlds will take place within an environment
largely defined by intellectual property rights of copyright, trademark, patent,
trade secret, and publicity rights,90 as well as the digital property rights
associated with NFTs and their smart contracts. Other than for the NFTs, each
of these doctrines is well established, making it likely that the application of
these intellectual property rights will be generally predictable within the
metaverse environment. Beyond the intellectual property regime, however,
there may be some areas where the expansion of virtual worlds to large-scale
adoption of a metaverse will have unanticipated implications and
complications.
Unlike the “real” world, the interactions within the metaverse are framed
by contractual relations between the site owner and the participants in which
the contractual agreements and terms of service take on an extremely important
role. There have been numerous examples of users on platforms challenging
the enforceability of end user license agreements or terms of service
agreements.91 When the host is a gaming company, such questions are generally
treated as simple contract issues.92 But if the use of virtual worlds develops into
“The Metaverse,” a single, ubiquitous platform or an interconnected series of
commercially owned platforms, then the market power of the host will raise
additional questions regarding the unconscionability of any terms imposed by
the all-powerful system owner, the potential to treat the platform as a common
90. See, e.g., E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097–98, 1101
(9th Cir. 2008) (trademarks); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (publicity
rights); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 788–91, 856 (2011) (free speech rights);
Pellegrino v. Epic Games, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 3d 373, 383, 385 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (false endorsement);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992) (copyright);
National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 844–46 (2d Cir. 1997) (copyright); see also
Sophie Goossens, Christine Morgan, Cem Kuru, Fred Ji & DJ Cespedes, Protecting Intellectual
Property In The Metaverse, 33 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 11–12, 14–16 (2021); Barlow, supra
note 61; Jessica Litman, Imaginary Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 127, 128–29 (2019); Mark A.
Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 534–37 (2003).
91. E.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2010);
Bragg v. Linden Rsch., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606–07 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see also Kevin Carr, Digital
Assets & License Protections in an Age That Denies Class Actions and Mandates Arbitration, 2021 J.
DISP. RESOL. 335, 336 (2021).
92. E.g., Blizzard Ent, Inc., 629 F.3d at 939, 941; Linden Rsch., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
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carrier, or to redefine and regulate the environment to avoid unfair and
deceptive trade practices.93
To the extent the metaverse is used by governmental agencies, then the
spaces operated and managed by the government might be considered to
become designated public fora within the proprietary metaverse.94 Further
distinctions may be needed when a government official is acting in a private,
nongovernmental capacity from the person’s actions in an official capacity.95

93. See Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1220 (2021)
(granting cert. and vacating lower court decision as moot). In his concurrence to the dismissal of the
certiorari petition, Justice Thomas made this point:
The analogy to common carriers is even clearer for digital platforms that have
dominant market share. Similar to utilities, today’s dominant digital platforms
derive much of their value from network size. The Internet, of course, is a
network. But these digital platforms are networks within that network. . . .
....
Much like with a communications utility, this concentration gives some digital
platforms enormous control over speech. When a user does not already know
exactly where to find something on the Internet—and users rarely do—Google is
the gatekeeper between that user and the speech of others 90% of the time. It can
suppress content by deindexing or downlisting a search result or by steering users
away from certain content by manually altering autocomplete
results. . . . Facebook and Twitter can greatly narrow a person’s information flow
through similar means. And, as the distributor of the clear majority of e-books
and about half of all physical books, Amazon can impose cataclysmic
consequences on authors by, among other things, blocking a listing.
....
If the analogy between common carriers and digital platforms is correct, then
an answer may arise for dissatisfied platform users who would appreciate not
being blocked: laws that restrict the platform’s right to exclude.
....
None of this analysis means, however, that the First Amendment is irrelevant
until a legislature imposes common carrier or public accommodation
restrictions—only that the principal means for regulating digital platforms is
through those methods.
Id. at 1224–26 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir.
2019), dismissed as moot, Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1220
(2021); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 685 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Adam Candeub, Bargaining
for Free Speech: Common Carriage, Network Neutrality, and Section 230, 22 YALE J. L. & TECH. 391,
399 (2020) (“[C]ommunications regulation, particularly common carriage, has always encompassed
more than antitrust because communications networks offer essential public goods.”).
95. See Lindke v. Freed, 563 F. Supp. 3d 704, 710 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (“Courts have approached
this argument by examining whether the public official acted under color of state law in maintaining
the social media account, thereby triggering First Amendment concerns.”).
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A. State Regulation Through Gambling Laws
As the metaverse grows more robust in user experience and the Web3
expectations of participatory creative ownership, it must serve as a marketplace
for commercial transactions. Transactions involving only in-world digital
assets will be predominantly regulated with reference to the terms of service
required of all metaverse participants.96 If the world uses in-game currency,
then transactions are unlikely to trigger significant regulatory scrutiny. Even
here, however, there are variations among different state laws. In Kater v.
Churchill Downs, Inc.,97 the Ninth Circuit recently interpreted Washington
State’s Recovery of Money Lost at Gambling Act (RMLGA)98 very broadly.
The court explained:
[Virtual chips] permit a user to play the casino games inside the
virtual Big Fish Casino. . . . Without virtual chips, a user is unable
to play Big Fish Casino’s various games. Thus, if a user runs out
of virtual chips and wants to continue playing Big Fish Casino,
she must buy more chips to have “the privilege of playing the
game.”99
As a result, the plaintiff—and the 50,000 others who later joined the class
action—had the right to recover their losses in the game.100
96. See infra Section V.A. (discussing terms of service requirements). But see João Marinotti,
Tangibility as Technology, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 713–14 (2021) (noting that real property,
bailment and similar legal doctrines are not subject to contractual waivers and will take precedence
over attempts to limit liability by contract).
97. Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 2018).
“Gambling” is defined as the “[1] staking or risking something of value [2] upon
the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent event not under the
person’s control or influence, [3] upon an agreement or understanding that the
person or someone else will receive something of value in the event of a certain
outcome.”
Id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 9.46.0237 (2005)).
98. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.070 (1957).
All persons losing money or anything of value at or on any illegal gambling
games shall have a cause of action to recover from the dealer or player winning,
or from the proprietor for whose benefit such game was played or dealt, or such
money or things of value won, the amount of the money or the value of the thing
so lost.
Id.
99. Kater, 886 F.3d at 787; see James Gatto & Mark Patrick, How the Evolution of Games Has
Led to a Rise in Gambling Concerns: All Bets are On! Gambling and Video Games, NAT. L. REV.
(Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-evolution-games-has-led-to-risegambling-concerns-all-bets-are-gambling-and [https://perma.cc/R4MX-SW2R].
100. Peter Hayes, Churchill Downs, Others Settle Gaming App Suit for $155 Million,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 12, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/churchill-downs-otherssettle-gaming-app-suit-for-155-million [https://perma.cc/K7VN-JMFK].
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When game assets can be converted to cash, in-world wagering typically
meets the three-pronged test of (1) payment of some form of consideration, (2)
a result determined by chance rather than skill, (3) resulting in the award of a
prize.101 “While these three elements seem to be fairly simple terms, their
interpretation is not. Their meaning varies from state to state.”102 As the
metaverse expands, the potential for in-world assets to become exchangeable
for other things of value increases, meaning the prize becomes far more
important when a game is tied to the interoperability of the metaverse or two
exchangeable assets.
While most states may not treat in-game assets as illegal gambling when
used only for in-game play, if the in-game currency can be converted to money
or items of value, then game publishers and metaverse operators must address
the unintended additional legal implications.103 The lesson of Kater should not
be lost on Web3 architects. A relatively minor definitional construction in a
state gambling statute was enough to undermine a longstanding, robust online
business model. If states become frustrated with a loss of tax revenue,
regulatory control, or impotent consumer protection laws, they can easily
amend domestic laws to turn NFTs and in-game assets into regulated casino
chips, thereby imposing costly state liabilities on transactions previously
thought to be immune.104
B. Federal Regulation Through Money Transfer, Securities and Foreign
Investment Laws
Transferring funds or fungible assets within the game or world will be
subject to money transfer laws if the funds can be converted to currency, assets,

101. Gatto & Patrick, supra note 99 (“In general, if all three of these elements are present, that
offering may be an illegal lottery and may also constitute illegal gambling. If at least one of these
elements is removed, the offering will generally fall outside the anti-lottery/gambling laws.”).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Paul C. Nylen, Imposing a Deadline on the IRS: Artificial Intelligence Tries to
Beat “Starcraft” While the IRS Tries to Regulate Virtual Currency, 52 AKRON L. REV. 945, 953–54
(2019) (addressing tax obligation and foreign bank reporting obligations); Nika Antonikova, Real
Taxes on Virtual Currencies: What Does the I.R.S. Say?, 34 VA. TAX REV. 433, 441–42 (2015) (“A
taxpayer who receives virtual currency must include the fair market value of the virtual currency in
computing gross income both if currency was received in exchange for goods and services, and if it
was ‘mined’ by a taxpayer.”); Sean F. Kane, Virtual Worlds, Digital Economies, and Synthetic Crimes,
PRAC. LAW., Apr. 2008, at 35, 44 (“With such freedom of unregulated and unreported access and
transfer, as being offered first by Entropia Universe’s accounts, the Money Laundering Control Act
will be difficult to fully enforce.”).
104. See Kater, 886 F.3d at 787.
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or crypto.105 To the extent that virtual worlds are in the money-services business
as a function of the platform’s ability to exchange in-world digital assets for
fiat currency or cryptocurrency, then the platform will need to register as a
money-services business.106 Second Life has taken that step for its own
operations and more recently for its users.107 In-game banking and investment
services will likely be subject to the regulations governing real-world
activities.108 Depending on the financial transactions that can occur within the

105. See Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118
(1970), 18 U.S.C § 1956 (2018) (Bank Secrecy Act); see also Stan Sater, Do We Need KYC/AML: The
Bank Secrecy Act and Virtual Currency Exchanges, 73 ARK. L. REV. 397, 417, 422 (2020); Anton
Moiseienko & Kayla Izenman, Gaming the System: Money Laundering Through Online Games, RUSI
NEWSBRIEF, Oct. 2019, at 1, 3 https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusinewsbrief/gaming-system-money-laundering-through-online-games [https://perma.cc/VJW9-GRCL]
(“If a computer game allows players to transfer in-game items to each other, and these in-game items
can be exchanged into fiat currency, the gaming company’s position is similar to that of a virtual
currency exchange. But unlike gaming companies, virtual currency exchanges should be subject to
[anti-money laundering regulations].”).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a)(2) (“[T]he term ‘money transmitting’ includes transferring funds
on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited to transfers within this country
or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, facsimile, or courier. . . .”); Sater, supra note 105, at 398–
99.
In 2013, FinCEN published guidance titled Application of FinCEN’s Regulations
to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (2013
Guidance). The 2013 Guidance interpreted the BSA Regulations and
contextualized them to the virtual currency ecosystem while also inventing new
terms such as “user,” “exchanger,” “administrator,” “virtual currency,” and
“convertible virtual currency.” In subsequent guidance and administrative
rulings, FinCEN regularly uses these terms as well as defining new terms to
continually apply the BSA Regulations to different business models that are of
note in the virtual currency ecosystem.
Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001,
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (2013)).
107. Moiseienko & Izenman, supra note 105, at 3.
On 1 July 2019, Linden Lab, the developer of the online game Second Life,
announced that all Second Life users would henceforth need to register with its
fully owned subsidiary Tilia Inc., a money service business (MSB) licensed in 46
US states. As an MSB, Tilia is required to comply with AML/CTF obligations
under the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations, including in
relation to customer verification and suspicious transaction reporting.
Id.
108. See James P. Brennan, Joshua McDougall, Eric Hornung, Seth Litwack & Madiha Zuberi,
The Curious Case of Crypto, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Apr. 2018, at 8, 12 (discussing state
money transfer registration requirements in Washington and New York).
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game or virtual world, potentially every financial regulatory body could claim
jurisdiction over some aspect of these financial transactions.109
i. Money Transfer Regulations
There is a strong appetite for cryptocurrencies, but the need case may not
fully match the interest. “Despite the much-touted economic, political, and
ideological motivations behind the creation of cryptocurrencies, they have
emerged to address market frictions.”110 Prior to the emergence of
cryptocurrency, “Commerce on the Internet [had] come to rely almost
exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process
electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most
transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based
model.”111 The profitability of the trust model, after all, is built on “the absence
of complete trust between parties . . . [which] imposes costs on both institutions
and consumers, including contracting, search, and verification costs.”112
Decentralized finance (DeFi) offers a solution to improve trust and therefore
reduce transaction costs.
In many ways, the trusted third-party model continues to work well.113 As
a result, there are some cryptocurrencies that actually trade ownership off the
chain, relying on the intermediary to legitimize the transaction.114
109. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRYPTOCURRENCY ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/cryptoreport [https://perma.cc/74A4-RM46].
110. Hossein Nabilou & André Prüm, Central Banks and Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 39
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1003, 1005 (2020).
111. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1 (2008).
112. Erik Feyen, Jon Frost, Leonardo Gambacorta, Harish Natarajan & Matthew Saal, Fintech
and the Digital Transformation of Financial Services: Implications for Market Structure and Public
Policy,
BANK
FOR
INT’L
SETTLEMENTS
PAPERS,
July
2021,
at
2
https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap117.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ACX-998A] (“A fundamental
feature of payment markets is the need to keep track of payment obligations, and to verify the identity
of account holders or the veracity of payment tokens.”) (citation omitted).
113. See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Decentralized Finance, 6 J.
FIN. REG. 172, 191 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjaa010 [https://perma.cc/7HG4-NZKX]
(highlighting that the current financial system is built to address compliance obligations).
114. See Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing A Framework for Regulating
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 497–98 (2015).
A growing percentage of transactions, however, take place through one or more
intermediaries. Intermediaries act as custodians of cryptocurrency or
cryptocurrency credentials originally belonging to their clients and may facilitate
and clear transactions for clients without updating the public ledger. Such
transactions are referred to as taking place “off the block chain.” Off the block
chain transactions may not appear in the public ledger at all, or, if they do, they
appear as transactions involving not the sender and receiver, but the
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Understanding the regulatory model for cryptocurrency transactions and
transactions of nonfungible digital assets, therefore, will depend on the nature
of the particular transaction. Some transactions will be for fungible
cryptocurrency tokens, such as Bitcoin or Ether (Eth), that are written directly
to the distributed ledger.115 Other transactions for fungible tokens will be noted
by the trusted third-party intermediary in the intermediary’s own ledgers to
reduce the transaction costs associated with changes to the distributed ledger.116
And other transactions will be for nonfungible tokens, some of which will be
on chain and others will be noted by trusted intermediaries and recorded off
chain.117
Blockchain technology provides a great solution to the potential for doublespending, or having two parties make simultaneous claims to the funds while
they are in transit.118 Placing the record of the transaction into the distributed
ledger assures that the same token cannot be used more than once.119 But this is
just one of many issues for financial transactions. Additional risks include
“concerns about fraud, market manipulation, financial crime, consumer
protection, liability issues in distributed ledgers, the development of large,
intermediaries.
Id.
115. See Ryan Haar, Ethereum: What You Should Know Before You Invest, NEXTADVISOR (May
3, 2022), https://time.com/nextadvisor/investing/cryptocurrency/what-is-ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/
HJZ2-QNG5] (“Ethereum is a software platform that runs on a blockchain. Users can interact with the
platform using ether, the cryptocurrency associated with Ethereum—or buy and hold it as a store of
value. Ethereum is commonly used by developers, but there are people who also invest in the crypto
for its potential to be worth more over time.”).
116. Nathan Reiff, Blockchain Won't Cut Out Intermediaries After All, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 27,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/blockchain-wont-cut-out-intermediaries-after-all/
[https://perma.cc/XQG2-SMMB].
117. On-chain NFTs and Why They’re Better, ART HAUS, https://art.haus/on-chain-nfts-and
whytheyrebetter/#:~:text=One%20crucial%20difference%20between%20on,location%20of%20the%
20digital%20art [https://perma.cc/NBS3-ERLZ].
118. Nabilou & Prüm, supra note 110, at 1005–06; see also What Is Double-Spending?,
CRYPTOPEDIA (June 24, 2021), https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/double-spending-problemcrypto [https://perma.cc/GW7D-ARQD].
Double-spending is simply the process of making two payments with the same
currency or funds in order to deceive the recipient of those funds. With physical
currency, this really isn’t possible. You can’t give two people the same $20 bill
or silver coin. With most online payments, you trust a third party to make sure
funds are sent and received properly. Banks, credit card companies, and payment
processors validate the transactions themselves and minimize the risk of doublespending. With cryptocurrency, however, there’s no third-party intermediary—
just the sender and the recipient. How can crypto holders protect themselves
against double-spending? The answer is on the blockchain.
Id.
119. CRYPTOPEDIA, supra note 118.
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closed networks that can potentially create barriers to entry, data protection,
taxation policy for cryptocurrencies, monetary policy, and financial
stability.”120
Given this long list of potential issues, it is not surprising that each of the
U.S. financial regulatory bodies is seeking to be part of the regulatory
solution.121 There are four key regulatory regimes:
[1] Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN):
Regulates all crypto assets for [anti-money laundering (AML)
and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT)] purposes.122
[2] US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC):
Regulates crypto assets considered securities by applying the
Howey test.123
[3] Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC):
Regulates virtual currencies which are considered
commodities (Bitcoin and Ethereum).124
[4] Officer of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC): For banks
participating in the crypto ecosystem.125
In 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) updated guidance
provided by the various regulatory agencies with an effort to emphasize the
120. Nabilou & Prüm, supra note 110, at 1007–08 (internal citations omitted).
121. Brennan, McDougall, Hornung, Litwack & Zuberi, supra note 108.
State regulators apply state money transfers laws. The IRS considers
cryptocurrency property and subject to capital gains tax. The CFTC considers
cryptocurrency to be a commodity and subject to trading regulations. The SEC
suggests that cryptocurrencies are securities. The U.S. Treasury, via the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), considers it a currency subject to Office
of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) sanctions.
Id.
122. See Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), INT’L
MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2022)
(“Money laundering and the financing of terrorism are financial crimes with economic effects. Money
laundering requires an underlying, primary, profit-making crime (such as corruption, drug trafficking,
market manipulation, fraud, tax evasion), along with the intent to conceal the proceeds of the crime or
to further the criminal enterprise.”).
123. Paul Kim, The Howey Test: A Set of Rules That Determine if an Investment is a Security,
Bus. INSIDER (May 31, 2022), https://www.businessinsider.com/personal-finance/howeytest#:~:text=The%20Howey%20test%20determines%20if,from%20the%20efforts%20of%20others
[https://perma.cc/R8UJ-23BJ].
124. Customer Advisory: Understand the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading, CFTC,
https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/AdvisoriesAndArticles/understand_risks_of_virtual_currency
.html [https://perma.cc/3YGM-WQ2V].
125. Crypto Travel Rule in United States by FinCEN, NOTABENE , https://notabene.id/world/usa
[https://perma.cc/LN22-79WT] (“[W]here [the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)] uses ‘virtual
assets’ and ‘VASPs,’ FinCEN’s guidance uses money services businesses (MSBs.) and convertible
virtual currencies (CVCs).”).
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risk-based approach to cryptocurrency transactions, the emergence of NFTs,
and the expanded threats of ransomware.126 In 2021, for FinCEN raised
concerns that the most pressing concern has been the growth of cryptocurrencyfueled ransomware attacks.127
As a result of these concerns, FinCEN continues to require anti-money
laundering protocols and know your customer (KYC) banking regulations for
most cryptocurrency transactions, which will likely include all forms of tokens,
unless the asset is not merely nonfungible but also truly non-tradable.128 After
all, just because each digital object has a unique serial number, that does not
transform the object from a commodity into a unique asset. Automobiles have
vehicle identification numbers making each automobile unique, but in the
aggregate, there is a robust market for largely interchangeable vehicles
available for sale, lease, and trade. Each bill of paper currency has a unique
serial number, but the currencies remain wholly fungible.
Commodities can be tokenized using NFTs, but that does not mean there
are not markets for those items subject to financial disclosure regulations. “In
2011, FinCEN issued a final rule that, among other things, defined ‘money
transmission services’ to include accepting and transmitting ‘currency, funds,
or other value that substitutes for currency by any means.’ ”129 The use of the
phrase “other value that substitutes for currency” provided a broad,

126. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, DRAFT UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR
VASPS 4 (2021), https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/March%202021%20%20VA%20Guidance%20update%20-%20Sixth%20draft%20-%20Public%20consultation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8Q2-MKAH].
127. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FINCEN ADVISORY
FIN-2021-A004, ADVISORY ON RANSOMWARE AND THE USE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO
FACILITATE RANSOM PAYMENTS 4, 7 (2021), https://www.fincen.gov [https://perma.cc/P6LB-DKA5]
(“The severity and sophistication of ransomware attacks continue to rise across various sectors,
particularly across governmental entities, and financial, educational, and healthcare
institutions. . . . FinCEN’s review of BSA data has identified DarkSide and Sodinokibi/REvil as among
the most costly ransomware variants in the first six months of 2021. During this timeframe, 458
ransomware related transactions were reported with a total value of $590 million.”).
128. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 109, at 22, 39, 41 (“In the United States, individuals
and entities that offer money transmitting services involving virtual assets, such as cryptocurrency
exchanges and kiosks, as well as certain issuers, exchangers, and brokers of virtual assets, are
considered [money services businesses (MSBs)].”).
129. Id. at 24; see also Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations
Relating to Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43585, 43596 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1021, 1022); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2021).
A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO VIRTUAL ASSETS AND
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transactional approach to value storage and various substitutes for traditional
fungible assets.130
For virtual worlds involving cryptocurrencies and tradable NFTs,131
FinCEN has consistently demanded that anyone who trades in these tokens will
be required to register, to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), and to
comply with anti-money laundering requirements.132 As a result, the numerous
KYC and other banking requirements suggest that most tokens might be better
characterized and regulated as securities, which may actually prove more
flexible to the enterprises trading the assets.
The DAO organizational structure is particularly inimical to the KYC and
AML obligations. “These reporting requirements are incredibly expensive and
are difficult for ‘traditional’ companies to comply with. Considering the fact
that most DAO members are basically anonymous, the AML/KYC
requirements alone would be prohibitive.”133 A DAO of any scale would require
some form of centralized reporting obligations that would undermine the
anonymity, flexibility, and shared governance of the DAO ethos. But both
DAOs and more traditional entities may actually find benefits within the
umbrella of traditional securities law rather than banking regulations.
ii. DAOs and the Potential Disclosure Requirements of the Corporate
Transparency Act
In 2021, Congress created another law designed to protect markets and
investments from opaque financial services. The Corporate Transparency Act
(CTA) was adopted as an amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering Act of

130. See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations-Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services Businesses, 74 Fed. Reg.
22129, 22137 (May 12, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note
109, at 24.
131. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 109 at 56 (“A non-convertible virtual currency may
effectively become a convertible virtual currency where a robust unofficial secondary market for the
currency develops and provides the opportunity to exchange the ‘non-convertible’ currency for fiat or
other virtual currency.”); FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS
AND
POTENTIAL
AML/CFT
RISKS
4
(2014),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cftrisks.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QWU-D7DU].
132. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, , FINCEN GUIDANCE
FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING,
OR
USING
VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES
(2013),
https://www.fincen.gov/
sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4YD-AKXQ].
133. Rodman, supra note 81.

GARON_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

IMPLICATIONS OF A UBIQUITOUS METAVERSE

195

2020.134 The law was developed to help combat money laundering, and is
primarily focused on the use of shell companies.135 “The CTA, part of the AntiMoney Laundering Act of 2020, established beneficial ownership information
reporting requirements for certain types of corporations, limited liability
companies, and other similar entities created in or registered to do business in
the United States.”136
Proposed regulations focus on entities filed through a state’s secretary of
state office, including corporations, LLCs, and limited liability partnerships.
“Under the proposed rules, a domestic reporting company is any entity that is a
corporation, a limited liability company, or other entity that is created by the
filing of a document with a secretary of state or similar office of a U.S.
jurisdiction.”137 While broad in scope, the CTA and the initial regulation’s focus
on formation through a document filed with the secretary of state may create at
least a short-term opportunity for DAO proponents to promote the use of DAOs
as an opportunity to avoid CTA reporting obligations.138 Invariably, however,
this distinction will eventually be addressed by regulation or statute.
iii. Securities Regulation
Although the operations of FinCEN are based on highly specific statutes,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has very broad statutory
authority, and it will continue to expand its role in the metaverse and Web3
financing.
The SEC will continue to play a significant role in regulating the
unregistered sale of tokens and digital assets that have the attributes of
134. Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 4547 (codified in
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.); see Brian K. Prosek, John R. Chadd & Kalynn G. Walls, The
Corporate
Transparency
Act,
NAT.
L.
REV.
(Dec.
1,
2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/corporate-transparency-act [https://perma.cc/6RWT-PH9C].
135. See Brooke Tansill, The Corporate Transparency Act: What Practitioners Need To Know,
VA. LAW., June 2021, at 14–15 https://virginialawyer.vsb.org/publication/?i=708504&article_id=
4039086&view=articleBrowser&ver=html5 [https://perma.cc/3837-LD9R].
136. Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule for Beneficial
Ownership Reporting to Counter Illicit Finance and Increase Transparency (Dec. 7, 2021),
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-proposed-rule-beneficial-ownershipreporting-counter-illicit [https://perma.cc/7RCP-HSBA].
137. Thomas G. Appleman, Vera S. Hansen, & Arthur L. Griem, FinCEN Publishes Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on the Corporate Transparency Act, NAT. L. REV. (Dec. 21, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fincen-publishes-notice-proposed-rulemaking-corporatetransparency-act [https://perma.cc/V7Z4-9T64].
138. Nick Oberheiden, 5 Things to Consider When Creating a DAO, JD SUPRA (Feb. 8, 2022),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/5-things-to-consider-when-creating-a-dao-5888423/
[https://perma.cc/8ZTK-SLTQ] (“As unincorporated entities, [DAOs] do not need to follow the legal
formalities of incorporation such as registration. . . .”).
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securities. Any collaboration by participants within the virtual world to
monetize the digital assets created within the platform will trigger securities
regulation when the activities are collaborative, but the value is not created by
the effort of the individual users.139 State blue sky laws may play a role in
protecting the public from unscrupulous in-world get rich quick schemes, but
only to the extent there is state jurisdiction over the activity.140 For DAOs, the
theoretical argument is that the collective ownership and shared community
responsibility suggests that value is created by the actions of each individual.141
But this may not be the reality for all DAOs, particularly if tokens derived from
payment carry less per-unit value than tokens derived from effort. The SEC and
state regulators could potentially treat many of the DAO structures as securities
notwithstanding the lack of a central manager directing the enterprise while
theDAO token owner sits back to make profit on the investment in a DAO
token.142
The Supreme Court has explained that a security includes many different
certificates denominating ownership. “Congress’ purpose in enacting the
securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and
139. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (“[A]n investment contract for
purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party . . . .”).
140. Mark
Astarita,
Blue
Sky
Law,
SEC
L.
(Dec.
5,
2019),
https://www.seclaw.com/glossary/blue-sky-law/ [https://perma.cc/Y8KR-KRR8] (“A blue sky law is
a state law regulating the offer and sale of securities, as well as the regulation of broker dealers and
stock brokers.”).
141. The SEC has rejected this position. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 4 (July 25, 2017),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NAN-DYHQ]
(hereinafter SEC DAO REPORT).
142. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1).
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof),
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id. A particular DAO NFT may fall into the definition of many of these certificates separate from any
attributes that make it an investment contract.
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by whatever name they are called.”143 In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,144 the Court
offered the definition of an investment contract as “whether the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.”145 In SEC v. Edwards,146 the Court further
explained that “when we held that ‘profits’ must ‘come solely from the efforts
of others,’ we were speaking of the profits that investors seek on their
investment, not the profits of the scheme in which they invest.”147 A DAO that
will grow in value primarily through its popularity and size may well have
increased value of investment or dividends potentially making the token
regulable as an investment contract, notwithstanding the direct management
provided in the DAO to every token holder.148
A suggestion has been floated that a DAO operated as a general partnership
should be immune from securities laws because, essentially, the risk one
assumes as a general partner should make one an active participant in the
investment.149 The caselaw, however, is more nuanced, suggesting that in
practice most general partners are active participants.150 To the extent that the
general partnership is comprised of limited partnerships or other passive, passthrough entities, the factual assertion of active management would disappear
and the “efforts of others” analysis would likely result in these entities also
operating as investment contracts.
The SEC has taken a similar approach. Reviewing the first DAO initial coin
offering (ICO), the SEC largely looked past the formalities of DAO shared
governance to find that the overall structure forced the investors to rely on the
organizers’ unique positions of knowledge, skill, and control to create value in
the tokens.151 As such, the tokens were securities. “The voting rights afforded
DAO Token holders did not provide them with meaningful control over the
enterprise, because (1) DAO Token holders’ ability to vote for contracts was a

143. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1).
144. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
145. Id. at 301.
146. 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
147. Id. at 393–94.
148. SEC DAO REPORT, supra note 141, at 4, 12–14.
149. See Rodman, supra note 81.
150. See SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755 (11th Cir. 2007) (“A general
partnership interest is presumed not to be an investment contract because a general partner typically
takes an active part in managing the business and therefore does not rely solely on the efforts of
others.”); SEC v. Schooler, 902 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
151. SEC DAO REPORT, supra note 141, at 12–14 (“Even if an investor’s efforts help to make
an enterprise profitable, those efforts do not necessarily equate with a promoter’s significant
managerial efforts or control over the enterprise.”).
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largely perfunctory one; and (2) DAO Token holders were widely dispersed
and limited in their ability to communicate with one another.”152
The characteristics that will determine these outcomes will be based in the
intersection between the DAO’s governance documents, its end user license
agreement, and the smart contract provisions embedded into the NFTs. As a
result, the programming choices that define the smart contract provisions may
define whether or not the NFT adopted by a particular DAO will be regulated
as an investment contract.
iv. Foreign Investment Regulation
If the predictions of the metaverse prove to be even partially correct, then
the metaverse will have the potential to disrupt the institutions and relations that
govern both domestic and international politics. No country is more concerned
about that disruption than China, which tightly controls all means of dissent and
is increasingly focused on all forms of international commerce.153 Russia and
152. Id. at 14.
153. See Drake Bennett, The Metaverse Gives China a New Digital Playground to Censor,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-12-10/chinametaverse-offers-new-digital-playground-for-censorship [https://perma.cc/FLV2-KXDY].
China’s reticent approach to gaming, accompanied by encouragement for
young people to go out and partake in real-world sports, is perhaps a preview of
its view of the metaverse. . . .
In one corner would be the authoritarians eager to limit the metaverse, or
perhaps even to use it as a pretext for expanding existing prohibitions. The
always-on nature of the imagined virtual world, its blurred boundary with socalled meatspace, could represent possible new frontiers of surveillance and
restrictions. Robert Williams, a China policy researcher at Yale Law School,
points out in an email that the definition of what now constitutes problematic
online gaming could end up broadening “in a social context where the lines
between physical and digital reality are somewhat blurred.”
Id.; see also China Targets Online Platforms in Quest to ‘Clean Up’ Internet, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec.
23,
2021),
https://news.yahoo.com/china-targets-online-platforms-quest-113410595.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3K2-3JZZ] (“China will scrutinise online platforms . . . as part of its drive to ‘clean
up’ the internet . . . . The investigation comes against the backdrop of a wide-ranging crackdown by
regulators on several sectors, with officials tightening oversight of companies in technology, real
estate, gaming, education, cryptocurrencies and finance.”); Alex Chan, Hong Kong Pro-Democracy
News
Site
Closes
After
Raid,
Arrests,
NPR
(Dec.
29,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/12/29/1068696336/hong-kong-police-raid-pro-democracy-news-outletarrest-6 [https://perma.cc/E3DS-26HV]; OFF. OF THE U.S. SEC’Y OF STATE, THE ELEMENTS OF THE
CHINA CHALLENGE 28, 30 (2020) https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KXR-L7W3] (“China’s pursuit of global
preeminence and drive to remake world order flow from the CCP’s overarching sensibility. That
sensibility is authoritarian, collectivist, and imperial. . . . [I]t promulgates among the people a rigid
ideology from which it tolerates no dissent.”); THE LONGER TELEGRAM: TOWARD A NEW AMERICAN
CHINA STRATEGY 48–49 (2021) https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-
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other foreign governments have their own agendas regarding U.S. technology,
and those programs may extend into the work in artificial intelligence,
communications technology, 5G, synthetic media, NFTs, cryptocurrencies and
blockchain services, and other innovations that will fuel Web3 growth and the
proliferation of the metaverse.154 The U.S. government, in contrast, is very
concerned that foreign control of these technologies would have the potential
to give foreign adversaries an advantage over the U.S. and its strategic agenda,
and could be used to harm either the U.S. domestic agenda or be used to
compete unfairly on an economic basis with U.S. companies.155
To address these concerns, in 2018, Congress passed the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA).156 The
purpose of the law was to expand the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS).157 CFIUS has operated since 1975,
granting the President authority “to block or suspend proposed or pending
foreign ‘mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers’ of U.S. entities, including through
joint ventures, that threaten to impair the national security.”158 Implementing
Longer-Telegram-Toward-A-New-American-China-Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TDYJMR2] (“China will reject all forms of international human rights pressure concerning Xinjiang, Tibet,
Hong Kong, as well as other forms of domestic political and religious dissent within China proper, as
the regime doubles down through its repressive control systems in defense of the Leninist state.”).
154. See, e.g., Anna Baydakova, Russian Government Introduces Crypto Bill to Parliament Over
Central Bank Objections, COINDESK (Feb. 21, 2022), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/02/21/
russian-government-introduces-crypto-bill-to-parliament-over-central-bank-objections/
[https://perma.cc/5S3A-EVAJ]; see also Alun John, Samuel Shen & Tom Wilson, China's Top
Regulators Ban Crypto Trading and Mining, Sending Bitcoin Tumbling, REUTERS (Sep. 24, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-central-bank-vows-crackdown-cryptocurrency-trading2021-09-24/ [https://perma.cc/TD7C-YBTB].
155. Ryan Browne, Biden Just Put Out an Executive Order on Cryptocurrencies—Here’s
Everything That’s in it, CNBC (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/heres-whats-inbidens-executive-order-on-crypto.html [https://perma.cc/UU8Q-KM2W]; Tami Stark & Ben Elron,
US Regulators Seek to Prevent Use of Crypto to Circumvent Russia Sanctions, WHITE & CASE (Apr.
6, 2022), https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/us-regulators-seek-prevent-use-crypto-circumventrussia-sanctions [https://perma.cc/3MUD-RT3U].
156. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132
Stat. 2173 (2018).
157. See Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons,
85 Fed. Reg. 3112, 3112 (Jan. 17, 2020) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 800, 801) (“FIRRMA amended
and updated section 721 (section 721) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), which delineates
the authorities and jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS
or the Committee).”).
158. JAMES K. JACKSON & CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10952,
CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA 1 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W639-WSYD] (“CFIUS is an interagency body comprised of nine Cabinet members,
two ex officio members, and others as appointed that assists the President in overseeing the national
security risks of FDI in the U.S. economy.”).
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regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Treasury (which serves as
chair of CFIUS) took effect in February 2020 which expanded the scope of
CFIUS review, making the process potentially relevant to many of the global
transactions that could fund or shape the metaverse. The regulations address the
expansion of CFIUS review of “TID U.S. businesses,” a new acronym for
critical technologies, critical infrastructure, and personal data.159 This includes
transactions that provide foreign investors access to material nonpublic
technical information, sensitive personal data, and “substantive involvement in
the U.S. business’s decision-making with respect to the technology,
infrastructure, or data.”160
Specifically, the final regulations include, among other reasons for review,
transactions involving:
(3) Any involvement, other than through voting of shares, in
substantive decisionmaking of the TID U.S. business
regarding:
(i) The use, development, acquisition, safekeeping, or release
of sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens maintained or
collected by the TID U.S. business;
(ii) The use, development, acquisition, or release of critical
technologies; or
(iii) The management, operation, manufacture, or supply of
covered investment critical infrastructure.161
The regulations also provide a lengthy definition of sensitive personal data
that covers U.S. government and military personnel or contractors, financial
data, health care and health status data, geolocation data, biometric and genetic
data, stored communications, and more.162 The scope of the sensitive personal
data is sufficiently broad to include essentially all metaverse platform operators
as well as most social media services. The only limitation is that the regulation
excludes entities that have collected data on one million or fewer individuals,
though this limitation will not apply if the entity has the capability to exceed
the one-million individual threshold.163
159. See Antonia I. Tzinova, New CFIUS Regulations Finally Take Effect, HOLLAND & KNIGHT
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2020/02/new-cfius-regulationsfinally-take-effect [https://perma.cc/AR6E-SWYC]; Nicholas J. Spiliotes, Charles L. Capito & Joseph
A. Benkert, Foreign Investment 2020 (Part 3): CFIUS Spotlight on “TID” U.S. Businesses, MORRISON
& FOERSTER (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/191015-foreign-investment2020.html [https://perma.cc/U6MA-MGF8].
160. Tzinova, supra note 159.
161. Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons, 85
Fed. Reg. at 3127 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.211(b)(3)).
162. See id. at 3132 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.241(a)(1)(ii)).
163. Id. (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.241(a)(1)(i)(B)).
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In addition to the inclusion of sensitive personal data, Congress extended
FIRRMA’s definition of “ ‘critical technologies’ to include ‘emerging and
foundational technologies’ controlled by the 2018 Export Control Reform Act
(ECRA).”164 This further extends the regulatory protection of Web3 under
CFIUS.
The role of CFIUS in the metaverse is not hypothetical. In 2019, the Trump
administration began a very public review of TikTok, threatening to ban the
company because of its Chinese ownership.165 Some of those actions were
eventually reversed by the Biden administration, but additional reviews of
Chinese investments were put in place, including many that will still impact
Web3 and metaverse technologies.166 The ownership of TikTok, in particular,
was complicated because the Trump administration ordered both a CFIUS
review and a separate executive order under “the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to outright ban ‘transactions’ with entire
companies.”167 The executive order was reversed by the subsequent Biden
executive order,168 while the CFIUS review of ByteDance’s ownership of
TikTok remains ongoing but in seeming abeyance.169
The role of CFIUS in TikTok is even more confounding since ByteDance
did not acquire a U.S. company to obtain the sensitive personal data potentially

164. Adam Chan, CFIUS, Team Telecom and China, LAWFARE (Sept. 28, 2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/cfius-team-telecom-and-china [https://perma.cc/T72A-U3DC]; see also
Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons, 85 Fed. Reg. at
3128 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.215).
165. See Christopher M. Caparelli, Taking on TikTok: CFIUS on the Front Page (and in the Fine
Print), TORYS (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.torys.com/our-latest-thinking/publications/2020/09/
taking-on-tiktok [https://perma.cc/FX9X-VEVH] (“Shortly before the Trump administration’s bans
against TikTok and WeChat were set to take effect on September 20, two U.S. federal judges issued
preliminary injunctions . . . . In the TikTok case, the court enjoined the government’s ban on
downloads and software updates of the popular application.”); Emily Birnbaum, “This Has Been
Botched”: This is What Makes Trump’s TikTok Tirade so Unusual, PROTOCOL (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.protocol.com/cfius-tiktok-not-how-this-works [https://perma.cc/6Y6S-BHXU].
166. See Nova J. Daly, Nazak Nikakhtar, Daniel P. Brooks, John Allen Riggins & Adam M.
Teslik, Biden Administration Revokes Trump EOs Targeting TikTok, WeChat, and Other Chinese
Software Apps; Initiates Broader Investigations into Software Apps by Foreign Adversaries, WILEY
(June 11, 2021), https://www.wiley.law/alert-Biden-Administration-Revokes-Trump-EOs-TargetingTikTok-WeChat-and-Other-Chinese-Software-Apps-Initiates-Broader-Investigations-into-SoftwareApps-by-Foreign-Adversaries [https://perma.cc/R8FP-3CNW].
167. See Chan, supra note 164.
168. See Daly, Nikakhtar, Brooks, Riggins & Teslik, supra note 166.
169. Rick Sofield, John Satira & Olivia Hinerfield, TikTok and Oracle Ink Data-Storage
Agreement in Apparent Effort to Avoid Further CFIUS Scrutiny, VINSON & ELKINS (June 24, 2022),
https://www.velaw.com/insights/tiktok-and-oracle-ink-data-storage-agreement-in-apparent-effort-toavoid-further-cfius-scrutiny/ [https://perma.cc/2UYJ-GJTK].
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held by TikTok.170 Instead, it simply made its own application available in the
U.S. using the Google Play Store and Apple App Store.171
Nonetheless, the lesson from TikTok and the expanded authority under
FIRRMA will have a profound impact on the growth of Web3 and the
metaverse. Foreign investments are being discouraged and regulatory scrutiny
is expanding.
C. Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Additional Areas of Focus for Regulators
The metaverse will likely become home to many online pastimes beyond
role-playing games and fantasy sports leagues. Among them will be those
associated with public vice. These will include gambling, sales of drugs and
illicit items, and pornographic adult entertainment. Some of these unsavory
activities are more heavily regulated than others, and it is likely that the state
and federal regulators of such activities will seek to regulate these activities.
Financial services companies will not provide financial services for illegal
activities and tend to avoid those companies which may trigger such regulatory
scrutiny. Uses such as these could make collaborations by the financial services
sector more difficult. However, it is also possible that the lure of the metaverse
payday will encourage the financial sector to look beyond the sector of illegal
activity in order to be part of the broader transition. Concerns over illegal
activities might also drive corporations to segment and separate their
operations, creating an internet of virtual worlds rather than a unified
metaverse. Interoperable virtual worlds would help more risk-averse
enterprises participate without taking on all the challenges of an unregulated,
virtual wild west.
At the other end of the use case, to the extent the metaverse becomes a
platform for online business meetings, trainings, and classroom settings, the
platforms and the business operating on those platforms will also be required
to comply with various Americans with Disabilities Act accommodation
obligations for those consumers who have a medical impairment or health
issue.172 The structure of the metaverse must take into account the needs of
those users who are hearing impaired, visually impaired, have motor-skill
limitations, or have other special needs.173 To the extent the metaverse is
170. See Daly, Nikakhtar, Brooks, Riggins & Teslik, supra note 166.
171. Elizabeth Atkin, A Complete History of TikTok—From Launch and Banning Controversy,
to Best Viral Trends, METRO (Feb. 13, 2021), https://metro.co.uk/2021/01/01/a-complete-history-oftiktok-launch-us-ban-and-best-viral-dances-13823263/ [https://perma.cc/3VZT-PVMD].
172. Squire Patton Boggs, Employment Law In The Metaverse—Part 2, FAMILY WEALTH REP.
(Aug. 18, 2022), https://www.familywealthreport.com/article.php?id=195325#.YwuTj3bMKM8
[https://perma.cc/9NRA-LFPT].
173. Id.
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offering an alternative to a public accommodation, the provider of that service
must take reasonable steps to assure that all customers are able to take
advantage of that service.174
This last set of obligations, in turn, requires the providers of the metaverse
platform to address the social responsibility, as well as legal responsibility, it
will have in managing the character and tone of the metaverse environment.
Through enforcement of the terms of service, congressional adjustments to the
Communications Decency Act § 230 safe harbor,175 and updated privacy
laws,176 the success or failure of the metaverse may well depend on the extent
to which privacy rights are protected and harmful, trolling behavior is curtailed.
Like enterprises on the current internet, each service provider will have ongoing
obligations to protect the privacy and security of the information and data of its
customers as well, making compliance with applicable privacy and security
laws an essential component of each company’s metaverse strategy.177
Another of the significant risks lurking in a ubiquitous metaverse is the
threat of cybersecurity breaches. Corporate espionage, ransomware attacks,
international cyberwarfare incursions, and old-fashioned hacking will all move

174. Id.
175. See 47 U.S.C § 230; George Fishback, How the Wolf of Wall Street Shaped the Internet: A
Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 28 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275, 283–90
(2020); Jon M. Garon, Constitutional Limits on Administrative Agencies in Cyberspace, 8 BELMONT
L. REV 499, 536 (2021).
176. See Rick Buck, Introduction to Data Privacy in 2021, WIREWHEEL (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://wirewheel.io/data-privacy-laws-guide/ [https://perma.cc/Z7V9-6UNY] (“Over the past few
years, the proliferation of data privacy laws has accelerated around the world. And this trend is not
about to stop. According to Gartner, ‘by 2023, 65% of the world’s population will have its personal
data covered under modern privacy regulations.’ ”); Cynthia J. Larose & Christopher J. Buontempo,
US State Privacy Law Update, NAT. L. REV. (June 11, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/us-state-privacy-law-update-june-11-2021 [https://perma.cc/956L-AZWQ].
177. See Wayne Unger, Reclaiming Our Right to Privacy by Holding Tech. Companies
Accountable, 27 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–17 (2020) (“Privacy trade groups frame compliance with
privacy and security laws as a means of reducing corporate risk—not a means of actually protecting
individuals’ PI by improving a business’s privacy and security practices.”); Stanley A. Marciniak III,
Comment, Too Big to Protect: A Dodd-Frank Framework for Protecting 21st Century American
Consumer Privacy Rights, 59 DUQ. L. REV. 329, 348–49 (2021) (“If Americans cannot stop ‘pervasive’
data collection, use, and sale, the question becomes: ‘[w]hat do we do?’. . . . In short, the answer lies
in the law. Imposing accountability-based legal structures on corporations that define ‘fair and unfair
uses of information’ can catalyze a solution.” (quoting FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 52 (2015)); Anita L. Allen,
An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Own Information Privacy?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 845, 852 (2013) (“In
addition to ‘first-order’ duties to protect one’s own privacy, there may also be ‘second-order,’
derivative duties to protect one’s own privacy for the sake of specific others or the community.”).
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to the metaverse because that’s where the money is.178 The FBI has identified
theft in the cryptocurrency marketplace as one of the key concerns for the
cryptocurrency industry.179 Among the myriad of fears and threats, the FBI
report notes that “criminals routinely infect victims’ computers and servers with
ransomware,”180 others “demand payment after threatening to distribute
confidential or embarrassing information (such as nude photos in cases of
‘sextortion’),”181 organize and fund terrorism,182 traffic in child pornography,183
counterfeit goods and services,184 and commit tax fraud.185
In a 2016 survey of corporate boards at publicly traded corporations, 70%
stated that cybersecurity was the top concern for their company.186 “The
organizations that rely on data have increasingly come to fear ‘data breaches,’
‘security incidents,’ ‘malicious actors,’ ‘ransomware’ and a host of emerging
threats that take up growing amounts of time in server rooms, boardrooms and,
if recent trends continue, courtrooms.”187
The responsibility for oversight to forestall these breaches, hacks,
incursions, and exfiltrations will fall on the entities that comprise the metaverse,
and the responsibility for acting responsibly will fall on the officers and
directors of those enterprises. Corporations operate through their centralized

178. See Willie Sutton, FBI: HISTORY, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/willie-sutton
[https://perma.cc/R5XR-NPBY] (highlighting the gentlemen bank robber, known for his polite
demeanor and dapper dress, who famously answered the question “why he robbed banks” by saying,
“because that’s where the money is.”).
179. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 109, at viii. (“[I]llicit uses of cryptocurrency typically fall
into three categories: (1) financial transactions associated with the commission of crimes; (2) money
laundering and the shielding of legitimate activity from tax, reporting, or other legal requirements; or
(3) crimes, such as theft, directly implicating the cryptocurrency marketplace itself.”).
180. Id. at 7.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 7, 11.
183. Id. at 10.
184. Id. at 12.
185. Id. at 14. In the first six months of 2019, data breaches compromised an estimated 4.1 billion
records, 3.2 billion of which came from just eight isolated breaches. Davey Winder, Data Breaches
Expose 4.1 Billion Records in First Six Months of 2019, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2019)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/08/20/data-breaches-expose-41-billion-records-infirst-six-months-of-2019/?sh=46f17810bd54 [https://perma.cc/3MK6-5XAB].
186. Charles Weinstein, Concerns About Risks Confronting Boards – 2015 Survey,
EISNERAMPER (Mar. 2016), http://www.eisneramper.com/Risk-Management-Cybersecurity-SocialMedia-0116.aspx [https://perma.cc/5LG6-RCRE].
187. Gerard M. Stegmaier & Courtney E. Fisher, Caveat Director Analyzing Cybersecurity
Challenges in Corporate Governance, 38 DEL. LAW. 14, 14 (2020).
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management, while DAOs operate through the community will.188 The business
judgment rule provides corporate directors a strong presumption against
liability.
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors . . . . It is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.189
Under the business judgment rule, decisions made by corporate directors
are generally not subject to shareholder liability or other second-guessing
provided they are made in good faith.190 To achieve these protections,
enterprises and the directors of enterprises need to undertake meaningful
corporate compliance programs for each area in which there are affirmative
regulations as well as in areas where there may be significant risk of loss or
harm.191
If, as many believe, cybersecurity incidents are inevitable,
officers and directors will face an increasingly difficult
challenge to respond systematically to these enterprise risks in
ways that are demonstrable. Although the business judgment
rule provides formidable protection, how business judgment is
exercised and the defense of its exercise in the area of
cybersecurity and its oversight is growing rapidly. The
situation is more complicated because security is but one
among many demands on the enterprise. . . . [W]hile
companies could take a series of security precautions, directors
must help ensure and provide guidance regarding all corporate
interests among many potential stakeholders and with

188. Cathy Hackl, What Are DAOs And Why You Should Pay Attention, FORBES (June 1, 2021),
http://forbes.com/sites/cathyhackl/2021/06/01/what-are-daos-and-why-you-should-pay-attention
[https://perma.cc/2VZA-83EG] (“The governance of DAOs is based on community, while traditional
companies’ governance is mostly based on executives, Board of Directors, activist investors. etc.
DAOs’ operations are fully transparent and global, meanwhile, traditional companies’ operations are
private, only the organization know what is happening, and they are not always global.”).
189. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (first citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); then citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971);
and then citing Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refin. Corp. 126 A. 46 (Del. Ch. 1924)), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000); see Steven A. Lauer & Joseph E. Murphy,
Compliance and Ethics Programs: What Lawyers Need to Know to Understand the Development of
This Field, 75 BUS. LAW. 2541, 2560 (2020).
190. Lauer & Murphy, supra note 189, at 2560.
191. See id. at 2561; see also Stegmaier & Fisher, supra note 187, at 23.
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substantial personal risk.192
For DAOs, these protections may not be available. The lack of structured
decision-making, the ability to inform oneself, and the other attributes of
management will not be present. Suddenly, those features may become legal
liabilities—bugs in the corporate code of conduct. Even for traditional
corporations, the need to create robust privacy, cybersecurity, and legal
compliance systems will be a time consuming and expensive task.
The challenges for operating in the fully realized metaverse are daunting,
and it will likely emerge in fits and starts over many years. But as well the
internet’s transformation of media, gaming, commerce, and financial services,
the potential for an immersive next stage in communications is anticipated too
heavily for it to remain fiction. Someone will soon be willing this reality into
existence. As such, the legal community must be ready to face what that reality
will bring and help foster the best version of this next future.
V. TRANSACTING BUSINESS IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD
To focus the myriad of potential issues for the multiverse of evolving virtual
worlds, this Article will use the fictional “Ginormaverse,” a theoretical U.S.based virtual world featuring many of the important aspects of a successful,
commercially-focused, next-generation virtual world.193 Ginormaverse
provides services for work, education, entertainment, commerce, and news
from its common platform. This Article is not using Ginormaverse because it
discounts the potential of DAOs to help fuel a more disaggregated multiverse,
but merely because it is reasonable to predict that the attributes of the metaverse
will take on a homogenous state whether the ownership is highly distributed or
highly concentrated.194 The legal issues will be the same in both the ubiquitous
metaverse and the fragmented multiverse; the difference will be a greater
variety of contractual terms and compliance modalities.
These are some of the critical features of Ginormaverse:
• Each user has a verified identity, protected by an
encryption
technology,
with
multi-factor
192. Stegmaier & Fisher, supra note 187, at 23.
193. The name Ginormaverse was selected after a brief Internet search identified significant use
for metaverse, ultraverse, megaverse, superverse, giantverse, gigantiaverse, universe, magaverse,
whopperverse, and other names in the “verse” family. Whopperverse was not used but closely
associated with both Burger King and Hershey’s Whoppers Malted Milk Balls.
194. See generally Salvatore Ferraro, What Limits Shareholder Activism is the Free-Rider
Problem, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 11, 2019), https://theconversation.com/what-limits-shareholderactivism-is-the-free-rider-problem-127232 [https://perma.cc/R6GN-7KPD] (“Economists call it the
free-rider problem. In essence it’s the problem of individuals having little incentive to contribute to a
collective resource when they can enjoy its benefits even if they don’t.”).
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authentication. A user can operate within many of the
worlds pseudonymously, but for non-entertainment
purposes, most operations require a true identity.195
Technology will allow users to shift from virtual
reality to camera-based live images using augmented
reality glasses or other means, so that a person’s live
image can be present within the virtual world when
appropriate rather than just an avatar.
Each user’s avatars are portable, meaning that the
avatars can be used with all their features, attributes,
and digital property, across all other compatible
platforms. There may be other universes that are not
interoperable, but those become irrelevant outside the
platform.
Each category of commercial enterprise has a place in
Ginormaverse. There are banks, retailers with home
delivery, bookstores and libraries, offices, engineering
labs, schools, social clubs, churches and similar houses
of worship, conference centers, game rooms, and
every other aspect of social interaction available in the
United States. Existing major enterprises, including
Microsoft, Amazon, and Google, will operate within
the Ginormaverse environment as if the user were
engaging with these providers directly through a
computer or mobile device.

A. Terms of Service Agreements and the Law of the Metaverse
These policies, and many more, will be largely established by the Terms of
Service Agreement (ToS) or End User License Agreement (EULA) provided
by the platform and required as a condition of use by any person or enterprise
wishing to interact within the virtual world.196 Law365 explains that every
software vendor requires an agreement to “limit [its] liability for damages”;
“maintain control over distribution and use of . . . software”; “protect . . . rights
to terminate licenses”; and “restrict abuses of software.”197 Other commentors
195. See generally Przemyslaw Palka, The World of Fifty (Interoperable) Facebooks, 51 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1193, 1229–30 (2021) (“Put simply, products are interoperable if they can work
together. . . . ‘[T]he ability to transfer and render useful data and other information across systems,
applications, or components.’ [John Palfrey & Urs Gasser] nuance the definition by distinguishing four
layers of interoperability: technological, data, human, and institutional.”) (quoting JOHN PALFREY &
URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 5 (2012)).
196. See, e.g., Why Do You Need an End User License Agreement?, LAW365 (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.law365.co/blog/end-user-license-agreement [https://perma.cc/CS8D-LWE7].
197. Id.

GARON_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

208

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:163

highlight the importance of specifying intellectual property rights, establishing
(as well as limiting or disclaiming) warranties, restricting activities and uses,
and defining the scope and limitations of the user’s license to use the software
or participate on the platform.198
EULA or ToS agreements have become standard and ubiquitous in the age
of smartphones.199 The expectation that Ginormaverse or any virtual world will
require such an agreement is hardly surprising. The implications, however, take
on additional significance if the metaverse itself becomes ubiquitous and
universal. The ToS for a universal platform has the potential to become the
equivalent of positive national law. “The vast majority of Americans—97%—
now own a cellphone of some kind.”200
If use of the platform is required by the nation’s leading vendors such as
Google and Apple, social media giant Facebook, and Microsoft—which
remains relevant, if not dominant, in almost every digital sector—along with
large retailers including Amazon, Target, and Walmart, it will cover nearly
100% of Americans. The single ToS could end up being required for anyone
using a computer operating system (except for those few Linux holdouts that
do not also use either Microsoft or Apple), anyone who owns a smart phone,
anyone who shops online or uses digital coupons in stores, and so on.201
The social pressure on the parties drafting the Ginormaverse ToS may keep
the company from overreaching too extensively. At least theoretically, the
social backlash from excessive terms and the goal of maintaining customer
goodwill has discouraged some of the potentially harmful provisions from
becoming standardized in ToS contracts. Back in 2005, the Electric Frontier

198. Abanti Bose, Advantages and Disadvantages of End-User License Agreements, IPLEADERS
(July 25, 2021), https://blog.ipleaders.in/advantages-disadvantages-end-user-license-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/5EQC-XLYJ]; Jacqueline Gibson, Q&A What is an EULA?, LEGALVISION,
https://legalvision.com.au/q-and-a/what-is-an-eula/ [https://perma.cc/PD95-Z5UA] (“If you are using
an EULA as an addition to an overarching licen[s]e between you and a business, then the EULA will
ensure you have recourse to address any issues directly with the individual employees who use the
software, rather than only having a legal relationship with the business.”); Mike Young, EULA: 7 Key
Parts Of A Software End User License Agreement, MIKE YOUNG L. FIRM (Nov. 18, 2015),
https://mikeyounglaw.com/software-end-user-license-agreement-eula
[https://perma.cc/8M7TCGAA].
199. Cf. Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User’s Guide to EULAs, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Feb.
17,
2005),
https://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas
[https://perma.cc/Y2WK-4UBL] (perhaps policy makers should have heeded this warning from 2005).
200. Mobile
Fact
Sheet,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(June
27,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/W96C-X8XX] (“The share
of Americans that own a smartphone is now 85%, up from just 35% in Pew Research Center’s first
survey of smartphone ownership conducted in 2011.”).
201. See Auxier & Anderson, supra note 56.
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Foundation warned about EULAs by identifying hidden provisions aimed at
stifling consumer criticism, increasing customer monitoring, prohibiting
reverse engineering, and modifying both the licensed software and the EULA
itself.202 Although provisions prohibiting reverse engineering and allowing for
the modification of software and terms are common, contractual restrictions on
consumer feedback have been prohibited by Congress.203 Nonetheless, the
concern remains that provisions in the ToS to compel arbitration and to prohibit
class action lawsuits will remove the vast majority of conflicts out of the court
system.204 Whatever efficiency benefits this might provide, it also curtails the
development of the common law. If these provisions govern business-tobusiness transactions as well as business-to-consumer transactions that occur
within the virtual world, commercial law could essentially leave the jurisdiction
of the courts.
As discussed below, the ToS will be central to identify the scope and
ownership of each virtual world user’s intellectual property rights, privacy
interests, and potential for criminal liability under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA).205 The ToS will not be able to contractually waive positive
law requirements such as those data breach notification statutes or financial
regulations, but in many other areas, the ToS can be drafted to supplement or
eventually to undermine state and federal law governing the interactions among
the members of the public who agree to its terms of service. In addition, as
discussed below, the metaphor of a virtual activity may give rise to a very
different digital crime than the in-world understanding. For example, digital
items can be copied and perhaps criminally or tortiously erased. But despite the
virtual world metaphor, an in-world item cannot be stolen because it was never

202. Newitz, supra note 199.
203. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45, 57a (2016) (making void a
contract that prohibits consumer reviews, with exceptions for certain types of confidential
information); see Bill Moak, Online Reviews: Companies can’t bar Consumers from Posting Negative
Comments,
CLARION
LEDGER
(May
24,
2019),
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2019/05/24/online-negative-reviews-what-businessescan-and-cant-do-law-crfa-ftc/3770680002/ [https://perma.cc/AS3L-DA9T].
204. See, e.g., Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., No. 15-CV-00612-RSL, 2021 WL 511203, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2021) (an initial complaint about losing $1,000 in funds on a casino video game
ultimately resulted in a class action lawsuit resulting in a $155 million fund, $38,750 in attorneys’ fees,
and more than 50,000 class members); Kater v. Churchill Downs, No. 3:15-cv-006120RBL, 2018 WL
5734656, at *3 (W.D.Wash. Nov. 02, 2018) (defendant could not both pursue litigation and enforce
arbitration provision).
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030; see also Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV.
951, 1003 (2021); Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 423–24
(2008); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (2003).
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a physical object, and the change in access from one user to another may result
in a violation of the CFAA or other laws rather than theft.206
The ToS will be central to the protection, potential expansion, and
rebalancing of intellectual property rights. In this example, Ginormaverse will
be the copyright owner of the software and visual images created to own and
operate the platform.207 To permit the interoperability to work, the companies
sharing the common platform will need to cross-license the copyrights in their
respective audiovisual works as well as in the software code which runs those
works.208 The other vendors will require that the ToS provides that each vendor
retains its own copyright, granting a limited, non-exclusive license to
Ginormaverse in order to facilitate the interoperability and to standardize the
end-user’s interactions as each person moves from node to node within the
multiverse.
Ginormaverse and the other vendors could choose to make the core code
available even more publicly using a Creative Commons license, but history
suggests that the code will be protected vigorously from non-partner vendors
who do not cross-license their own code.209 If licensed in this manner, the
metaverse will begin to control and exclude which other vendors gain access to
the platform. In this way, the interoperable software will work much like the
controls used by Google and Apple over their respective app stores.210
If history remains any guide, the network effects strongly suggest that while
there may be a time of significant experimentation, the benefits of
interoperability and access to particularly popular resources along with
frictional barriers such as the learning curve for different platforms will result
in a very limited number of competitors. There may be a single multiverse, or

206. See Kerr, Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, supra note 205, at 419, 422–23 (distinguishing
violations of rules of play within the virtual world from misuse of credentials to steal funds from
attached accounts).
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (literary works and audiovisual works); GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL
JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF ONLINE WORLDS 170 (2010).
208. Some of the software will not be entirely functional and outside the scope of copyright.
Much of the code will be copyright protected, however, requiring cross-licenses.
209. PETE PERLEGOS, CROSS-LICENSING 17 (2005), http://perlegos.com/lawschool/
crosslicensing.pdf#page=17 [https://perma.cc/YR5V-G38P] (quoting RICHARD E. CAVES, HAROLD
CROOKELL & PETER J. KILLING, THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY LICENSES, OXFORD
BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS (1983)).
210. See, e.g., Nikolas Guggenberger, Essential Platforms, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 237, 263
(2021) (“Third-party app developers lack practical and reasonable alternatives to the two leading
platforms. . . . Moreover, developers remain tied to the app stores beyond the initial
download. . . . Google and Apple also compete in the secondary market for apps themselves. Google’s
apps reach 186 million users, Apple’s 105 million.”).
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like computer operating systems211 and smartphones,212 there may be a duopoly,
or it may broaden further. In gaming, for example, there are two dominant app
stores, but also Steam and the Epic Games Store,213 and the three major console
makers.214 Netflix and Amazon are also seeking to be competitive in games.215
Whether there is one metaverse, a few competing metaverses, or a Web3inspired multitude of providers, the virtual world will use its ToS to standardize
many of the users’ expectations within the platform.216 Areas within the virtual
world may have additional restrictions such as specially walled gardens for
content screened from young children and areas for only adolescents. Other
areas will be screened for the customers of a particular vendor. But these rules
will continue to operate within the constraints of the ToS that governs the
broader metaverse.
From a contractual standard, this allows the owner of the metaverse to
control the virtual space in much the same manner that a mall owner controls
the retail space at a mall or the owner of a platform often prioritizes its own

211. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[C]onsumers
would not switch from Windows to Mac OS in response to a substantial price increase because of the
costs . . . as well as because of the effort involved in learning the new system and transferring files to
its format.”).
212. See Guggenberger, supra note 210, at 262 (“Aside from third-party Android stores in China,
Google and Apple all but divide up the market for smart phone application platforms with the Google
Play Store and the Apple App Store. In 2019, users downloaded 85 billion apps from the Google play
store, and 31 billion from the Apple App Store.”).
213. See generally Andrew Beattie, How the Video Game Industry Is Changing, INVESTOPEDIA
(Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/053115/how-video-game-industrychanging.asp [https://perma.cc/JF69-M6P3] (“Tech giants such as Google, Meta [formally Facebook],
and Apple, have all made plans to enter the video game industry. . . . Microsoft (MSFT[has already
been in the gaming industry through its popular Xbox console.”); GRAND VIEW RSCH., GAMING
MARKET SIZE, SHARE & TRENDS ANALYSIS REPORT BY DEVICE (CONSOLE, MOBILE, COMPUTER),
BY TYPE (ONLINE, OFFLINE), BY REGION (NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, APAC, LATAM, MEA), AND
SEGMENT FORECASTS, 2022 – 2030, https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/gamingindustry?utm_source=prnewswire&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=ICT_08-Aug22&utm_term=gaming_industry&utm_content=rd1 [https://perma.cc/G2YJ-9RXC] (“The global
gaming market size was worth 202.64 billion in 2021 and is expected to expand at a compound annual
growth rate (CAGR) of 10.2% from 2022 to 2030” or 504.29 billion USD by 2030.).
214. US Video Gaming Industry in 2022: Gaming Devices & Video Game Content Viewership
Trends, INSIDER INTELLIGENCE (July 21, 2021), https://www.insiderintelligence.com/insights/usgaming-industry-ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/7E24-8VSL] (“Gamers turned to their Nintendo,
Playstation, and Xbox devices as time spent at home increased in 2020—monthly digital console
gamers saw a larger increase than any other gaming device, growing by 6.3% from 2019.”).
215. See Mike Snider, Video Games Playing on the Minds of Amazon, Netflix, Peloton and Zoom,
USA TODAY (July 24, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/07/24/amazon-netflixpeloton-zoom-video-games/8070256002/.
216. See, e.g., DECENTRALAND, supra note 85.
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products and services above those of the third-party vendors for which it
conducts business.217 This creates a competitive risk to those companies who
rely on the metaverse as a platform from which to conduct business and a
tremendous opportunity for the owner of the platform to leverage its own
products or services into a prominent position within the virtual world.
Ultimately, the success of the metaverse may determine the extent to which
antitrust and unfair competition laws are updated to address the practices of the
multiverse operators.
For some advocates of NFTs and DAOs, there is an effort to do away with
ToS and instead rely on smart contracts. Certainly, no one will miss the need to
click through pages of contractual provisions nearly impossible to read as a
condition of opening an app or logging into a website. At the same time,
however, ToS provide important legal protections for the companies and
important warranties for the consumers in e-commerce transactions. DAO
owners and the committees or assigned leadership will want contractual waiver
to reduce legal risk associated with the metaverse operation.218 Smart contracts,
since they are merely pre-programmed software interactions, do not provide the
risk management or contingency planning of true contracts. Perhaps the best
example can be seen in the crypto project ICON, which lost 14,000,000 ICX
tokens, worth $8 million at the time of the loss, because a programmer noted a
software error that permitted the user to mint 25,000 tokens for free on each
visit.219 Had ICON employed a ToS, it could have contractually required users
to meet investment criteria. It also could have reserved the power to legally
recall and reissue tokens in the event of catastrophic breaches (provided it did
so in a way that avoids simply forking the blockchain and causing losses to

217. Amazon.com Inc has been repeatedly accused of knocking off products it sells on its
website and of exploiting its vast trove of internal data to promote its own
merchandise at the expense of other sellers. The company has denied the accusations.
But thousands of pages of internal Amazon documents examined by Reuters—
including emails, strategy papers and business plans—show the company ran a
systematic campaign of creating knockoffs and manipulating search results to boost
its own product lines in India, one of the company’s largest growth markets.
Aditya Kalra & Steve Stecklow, The Imitation Game, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/amazon-india-rigging/ [https://perma.cc/2TJTLAHU]. See also Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 817, 828 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“Epic
Games Store was created to compete against the leading multi-publisher digital video game
marketplace on computer platforms, Steam, which is operated by Valve Corporation. The Epic Games
Store provides access to more than 250 games from more than 200 developers.”).
218. See, e.g., DECENTRALAND, supra note 85.
219. Crypto ‘Hacker’ who Exploited Bug to Mint $17M Could Still Keep It, PROTOS (Aug. 11,
2021),
https://protos.com/crypto-hacker-icon-icx-minted-bug-blockchain-property-right/
[https://perma.cc/K4AK-SVL9]; Birch, supra note 72.
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other owners’ assets).220 Smart contracting code cannot grant a DAO the legal
right to fix software errors, but since software errors are inevitable, metaverse
operators will inevitably recognize that legal contracts are more powerful than
smart contracts.
In addition, if contractual rights to correct catastrophic software issues are
not enough, there are also the myriad of regulatory compliance obligations that
the owner of a service must include to ensure that the customers of the service
are in compliance with the law and the contractual obligations of the metaverse.
Community standards, anti-obscenity and child pornography provisions,
copyright notice and takedown disclosures, limitations on investments to
accredited or otherwise qualified investors, and many other affirmative
obligations must be included in the contracts. As a result, metaverse
transactions will likely continue to be governed by contract law in each
jurisdiction.
B. Competition Harms and Consumer Protection
A particular concern of the metaverse that may be better addressed through
the competition spawned by DAOs and the multiverse is the tendency of
enterprises to promote their own activities over those of competitors. In the
abstract, this form of self-promotion is entirely reasonable. Nike, for example,
will be expected to stock only Nike shoes at its retail stores.221 There is no
consumer or regulatory expectation that it will provide Adidas or Converse
sneakers.222 McDonalds is not obligated to sell Burger King hamburgers, and it
can choose to contract with either Pepsi or Coca-Cola for its soft drinks. The
right to monopolize one’s own stores with one’s own goods or services does
not seem problematic, and any regulatory intervention would seem absurd.

220. See Birch, supra note 72 (“Poly Network had reported that a person or persons unknown
used yet more bugs in smart contracts to redistribute some $600m worth of Ether, Binance Coin and
USDC to cryptographically more deserving wallets . . . . Poly Network responded by abandoning code
is law and threatening both legal action and direct action . . . .”).
221. See Stephanie Stoughton & Leslie Walker, Manufacturers’ Online Stores Upset Their
Retailers, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/02/08/
manufacturers-online-stores-upset-their-retailers/9407a520-6097-4923-9364-1be9aa91ad86/
[https://perma.cc/H3DU-J8Q5] (“Sporting goods retailers were hardly pleased the day Nike Inc.
opened its own factory outlets, offering the swoosh-branded athletic shoes at discount
prices. . . . Nike’s bid to bypass retailers online underscores how the Internet is complicating longstanding business relationships. It is sending tremors through the retailing and manufacturing
industries . . . .”).
222. See Refusal to Deal, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/refusal-deal [https://perma.cc/89YN-SGF8] (“In general, a firm has
no duty to deal with its competitors.”).
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But the relationship changes when the store both sells goods and competes
with the vendors that sell on its platform. Again, it is not a problem new to the
internet. Discount stores and department stores have long sold store brands that
compete directly with the retailers who market through those chains.223 It is
common practice in the retail industry and has been the subject of FTC scrutiny.
The FTC has outlined situations where the leadership by a retailer’s
supplier—known as a category captain—might create antitrust concerns.
“[T]he category captain might: (1) learn confidential information about rivals’
plans; (2) hinder the expansion of rivals; (3) promote collusion among retailers;
or (4) facilitate collusion among manufacturers.”224 The first concern regarding
confidential information has increased in scope as the economy has shifted to
data-driven wholesale and retail strategies.225 The FTC has been concerned
about the ability of category captains to capitalize on their superior market
power to dominate the retail space, set preferential pricing arrangement, and
artificially heighten barriers to entry for competitors.226
The problem becomes significantly worse when the retailer is selling
competitors’ goods and services, competing with the competitors’ goods and
services with its own goods, and also serving as the research and promotional
platform for those goods and services. In essence, the platform serves as the
category captain and the chief rival to the competitors, competitors that are
deeply reliant on the platform to provide the marketing and distribution. For
example, in terms of smartphone, tablet, and computer apps, Google Play hosts
approximately 3.5 million apps, Apple App Store houses 2.23 million apps,
Windows Store hosts 669,000, and Amazon Appstore has 476,000.227
223. See Gregory Gundlach & Alex Loff, Competitive Exclusion In Category Captain
Arrangements
7
(Aug.
18,
2018)
(Antitrust
Inst.,
Working
Monograph),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Gundlach-and-Loff_Comp-Exc.-inCat-Cap_8.31.18-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL2D-GSAQ] (“The most popular approach to
category management involves ‘outsourcing’ decisions to a single manufacturer in the category (a.k.a.,
the ‘category captain’). . . . The extent of involvement and the level of influence and control held by a
category captain can be extensive.”); see also Bradley J. Lorden, Category Management: The Antitrust
Implications in the United States and Europe, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 541, 541–42 (2011).
224. Lorden, supra note 223, at 545 (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION WORKSHOP ON SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND OTHER MARKETING PRACTICES
IN THE GROCERY INDUSTRY 50 (2001)).
225. See Guggenberger, supra note 210, at 265, 266.
226. See generally Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa von Schlippenbach, Consumer Shopping Costs
as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung,
Working Paper No. 1020, 2010), https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1012
[https://perma.cc/B9RQ-3R9U].
227. Number of Apps Available in Leading App Stores as of Q2 2022, STATISTICA (Aug. 11,
2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-leading-app-stores/
[https://perma.cc/6PCS-4TN5].
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With millions of apps being hosted, the search algorithms and
recommendations are essential for companies to connect with customers. “But
as Apple has become one of the largest competitors on a platform that it
controls, suspicions that the company has been tipping the scales in its own
favor are at the heart of antitrust complaints . . . .”228 If competitors wish to
improve their placement, they have the option of paying Apple for that
priority.229
Apple is not alone in prioritizing its own products, charging its competitors,
and potentially using customer data for competitive advantage. Amazon, the
nation’s leading retailer, has claimed this title as well.230 “[I]nternal documents
also show that Amazon employees studied proprietary data about other brands
on Amazon.in, including detailed information about customer returns. The aim:
to identify and target goods—described as ‘reference’ or ‘benchmark’
products—and ‘replicate’ them.”231 For wholesalers and retailers, the
transactions with Amazon are a devil’s bargain. “53% of vendors see
themselves in direct competition with Amazon’s products.”232
Meta has been the subject of similar accusations. In August 2021, the FTC
updated its complaint against Meta (then Facebook) over its innovation
strategies.233 When Facebook was unable to develop its own apps to compete
in the mobile marketplace, “Facebook instead resorted to an illegal buy-or-bury
scheme to maintain its dominance. . . . And to further moat its monopoly,

228. Jack Nicas & Keith Collins, How Apple’s Apps Topped Rivals in the App Store It Controls,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/09/technology/apple-appstore-competition.html [https://perma.cc/89KT-AVXY].
229. Id. See Guggenberger, supra note 210, at 266.
230. See Aditya Kalra & Steve Stecklow, supra note 217; Karen Weise, Prime Power: How
Amazon Squeezes the Businesses Behind Its Store, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/amazon-sellers.html
[https://perma.cc/B9DKV6MN] (“Last year, Americans bought more books, T-shirts and other products on Amazon than eBay,
Walmart and its next seven largest online competitors combined, according to eMarketer, a research
company.”).
231. Kalra & Stecklow, supra note 217, at 3.
232. Guggenberger, supra note 210, at 259 (citing JUNGLE SCOUT, THE STATE OF THE AMAZON
SELLER 2020 24 (2020), https://www.junglescout.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/State-of-theSeller-Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL55-XDU4]).
233. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 1,
FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021) [hereinafter FTC Amended
Complaint] (“Facebook has maintained its monopoly position in significant part by pursuing Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”) Mark Zuckerberg’s strategy, expressed in 2008: ‘it is better to buy than
compete.’ ”).
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Facebook lured app developers to the platform, surveilled them for signs of
success, and then buried them when they became competitive threats.”234
Nor should Google be left off the list of self-dealing platforms, at least
according to allegations at the heart of recent litigation involving Epic Games
over the placement of Fortnite in the Google Play Store. According to the
complaint, Google had been willing to arrange a side-deal with Epic over the
percentage of fees charged, had arranged for payments to rival game company
Blizzard, increased restrictions on side-loading apps to stop circumvention of
the Play Store monopoly, and undertaken additional anticompetitive
strategies.235
These efforts, and many like them, have been the result of the
anticompetitive behavior of platforms because, much like scorpions, it is simply
in their nature. “[P]latform providers work to define both collected data and
algorithmic logics as zones of exclusivity. In particular, platforms use contracts
systematically to facilitate and protect their own legibility function, extracting
transparency from users but shielding basic operational knowledge from thirdparty vendors, users, and advertisers alike.”236
The future is already here.
Over the last two decades, digital platforms have become
crucial marketplaces that bring together demand and supply of
goods and services online. . . . They have gained systemic
relevance and shape the global economy. . . . As of August
2020, they represent an aggregate market valuation of $8.2
trillion.237

234. Press Release, FTC Alleges Facebook Resorted to Illegal Buy-or-Bury Scheme to Crush
Competition After String of Failed Attempts to Innovate, FTC (Aug. 19, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/08/ftc-alleges-facebook-resorted-illegal-buyor-bury-scheme-crush [https://perma.cc/QAE4-EJN9].
235. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, 32, Epic Games, Inc. v. Google,
LLC, No. 3:20-CV-05671-JD (No. 165-10) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Epic Amended
Complaint]; see Sean Hollister, The Epic v. Google Lawsuit Finally Makes Sense, THE VERGE (Aug.
19,
2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/19/22632804/epic-google-lawsuit-unredactedcomplaint-antitrust [https://perma.cc/5BAY-EVDD].
236. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 154
(2017).
[Epic] alleges the company was so worried about Epic setting a precedent by
abandoning the Play Store that it [Google] unleashed a broad effort to keep
developers from following the company’s lead. That included straight-up paying
top game developers, including Activision Blizzard to stick around, and sharing
additional chunks of its revenue with phone makers if they agreed not to preinstall
any other app stores.
Hollister, supra note 235.
237. Guggenberger, supra note 210, at 253–54.
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For platforms, the markets are driven by scale and fueled by network
effects.238 “Strong network effects can insulate a dominant personal social
networking provider from competitive threats until a disruptive or innovative
technology emerges to open up new ways for users to connect.”239 Of course,
while network effects are necessary to build a use case for a network, network
effects are not themselves sufficient, which is why companies resort to
anticompetitive practices to add additional competitive barriers, discourage
participants from leaving the networks, and forestall effective competition from
emerging.240
These digital platforms are striving to control Ginormaverse, and they are
likely to use competitive barriers, customer retention strategies, and buyouts to
maintain their advantage. Unsurprisingly, Web3 advocates are hoping to keep
this power out of their hands. The future of the metaverse will not turn on any
one competitive advantage, however, for as the Epic Games litigation
highlights, Android’s open-sourced operating system and the open architecture
of Android smartphones has been as successful as Apple and Amazon at
controlling the operating environment, exploiting the transactional data, and
crafting barriers to competition that empower the operational leadership to
dominate.241
As a result, any planning for the metaverse must take the potential consumer
harms for anticompetitive behavior into account, ex ante, before the model has
become too big to fail. Whether the enforcement is developed through smart
contracts, terms of service, or updated antitrust guidance, the bright-line
prohibition should be clear that a company which provides another company’s

238. See D’Arcy Coolican & Li Jin, The Dynamics of Network Effects, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ
(Dec.
13,
2018),
https://a16z.com/2018/12/13/network-effects-dynamics-in-practice/
[https://perma.cc/LNX9-2QLJ] (“The most successful companies and products of the internet era have
all been predicated on the concept of network effects, where the network becomes more valuable to
users as more people use it.”).
239. FTC Amended Complaint at 3, supra note 233. But see Coolican & Jin, supra note 238
(going beyond the assumption that each member of a network contributes equally to that network,
increasing the network’s value and competitive advantage to explore differences and limitations within
the network).
240. See Catherine Tucker, Network Effects and Market Power: What Have We Learned in the
Last Decade, TECH. & RSCH. POL’Y INITIATIVE, Spring 2018, at 72, 73–74 (2018)
https://sites.bu.edu/tpri/files/2018/07/tucker-network-effects-antitrust2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UCM2-D9HA] (discussing how the absence of “sunk costs” enables network users
to move rapidly from network to network). Earlier models of network effects presumed hardware costs,
user interface learning curves, and time establishing accounts as investments or sunk costs that would
likely retain customers. Id. In social media competition, these are largely absent. Id.; Coolican & Jin
supra note 238.
241. Epic Amended Complaint, supra note 235, at 8.
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goods or services should be precluded from competing with that company. Any
company can provide the platform and any company can compete on the
platform, but it is intrinsically anticompetitive to do both, and over time, the
network benefits of such competitive advantage will squeeze most competition
out of the marketplace.
The limitation on self-preference is essential for the metaverse to meet its
potential. In many ways, the metaphor of the virtual world is little more than a
visualized search function. Information, entertainment, contacts, products, and
services are all found for the user based on the search criteria and prior behavior
of that user. Ginormaverse will be the gateway to the information a person
needs each day. In that way, it will be much like Google is today. As of 2020,
for example, “across all platforms, including mobile and tablet, the Google’s
share hovers . . . at 88%.”242 It helped that Google bought the exclusive right to
be the default search engine on Apple operating systems and tied its search
engine to its own operating system, Android. Whether Google maintains that
dominance into the metaverse or a competitor replaces it, the potential to
prioritize and define the user experience will be tremendous. Only through
contractual and legal restrictions can this power be diffused.
C. Copyright
Because Ginormaverse is an interoperable platform, the ToS would likely
allow users to own the intellectual property rights in their avatar.243 Like most
games and virtual worlds, there would be free and low-cost stock avatars
available as well, but the users will likely wish to customize one or more
avatars, meaning that they would want the ability to use these in any
interoperable space.244 The right to retain copyright and other intellectual
property rights will be even more important to other assets beyond the avatars.
Although Ginormaverse will likely allow users to keep the copyright in
their works, the users will also need to warrant that they have the rights to the

242. Guggenberger, supra note 210, at 269 (citing Search Engine Market Share United States of
America,
STATCOUNTER GLOB. STATS,
https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-marketshare/all/united-states-of-america [https://perma.cc/YFQ6-TCBE]).
243. See Kevin Dong, Developing A Digital Property Law Regime, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1745,
1750–51 (2020) (“[V]irtual items are instead governed by the laws of intellectual property and
contracts.”); Kenneth W. Eng, Content Creators, Virtual Goods: Who Owns Virtual Property?, 34
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 252 (2016) (“[T]he law should first identify virtual goods that
warrant ownership rights and then extend copyright law to grant ownership protection to the enduser.”).
244. See Heather Mueller, What is Software Interoperability and How Can It Boost Profits and
Productivity?, FORMSTACK (June 24, 2021), https://www.formstack.com/resources/blog-softwareinteroperability [https://perma.cc/5ATM-QGCW].
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copyrighted materials used in the avatars and other content utilized within the
virtual world. The ToS will likely include specific representations and
warranties indemnifying Ginormaverse from any infringements by the users.
To the extent that Ginormaverse represents multiple copies of the content
needed to provision each user interaction on primary and secondary computer
servers, back-up systems, and cached systems used to reduce loading times, a
particular copyrighted work might be replicated numerous times within
Ginormaverse’s computer system. The ToS should take these reproductions,
archival copies, and public performances into account in the license from each
consumer and business activity utilizing the system.
For example, the Virtual Reality Church has been in operation since
2016.245 According to its pastor, D.J. Soto, “the spiritual connection people
experience in person in church, is equally accessible in virtual reality. ‘We
believe God is everywhere, he’s in physical dimensions, spiritual dimensions,
and virtual reality.’ ”246 Unlike a Zoom-based congregation, the participants
wearing VR goggles will be unable to read a print copy of their prayer book to
use during the service. To accommodate the need for prayer books within the
VR experience, the church should have a license from the publisher to provide
those works to parishioners within the VR environment. In a similar manner,
the sermons and homilies written by clergy for their online congregations will
be protected by copyright as soon as they are created, and the ToS should not
transfer that copyright from the author to the owners of Ginormaverse or other
platforms.
This will be equally true for all corporate documents, presentations,
educational materials, and other types of content created by individuals or
enterprises for presentation, discussion, or distribution within the virtual world.
Some of these works will also embody trade secrets, and potentially some of
these works could include attorney-client privileged content or attorney work

245. Chace Beech, Virtual Reality Church Brings Worship to New Dimensions, SPECTRUM
NEWS 1 (Mar. 15, 2021), https://spectrumnews1.com/ca/la-west/technology/2021/03/14/virtualreality-church-brings-worship-to-new-dimensions [https://perma.cc/4X7K-NQ9A] (“VR Church is
designed, built, and run entirely online. It was founded in 2016 by D.J. Soto, an ordained Bishop. He
was experimenting with virtual reality and realized he could marry this new technology with his
religious work.”).
246. Id. (quoting Bishop Soto).

GARON_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

220

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:163

product.247 Virtual doctor visits might use cameras rather than avatars, but could
still include medical records subject to HIPAA privacy and security rules.248
D. Confidentiality and Privacy
The importance of confidentiality and data security are more explicit when
the documents are governed by federal privacy laws such as the HIPAA privacy
rule249 or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial privacy rules,250 but these concerns
are nearly as significant for any business operating within Ginormaverse that is
concerned about its trade secrets and confidential data.251
247. On August 10, 2008, the Section presented a panel program entitled “Real Concerns
When Practicing in Virtual Worlds” at the ABA Annual meeting in New York
City. . . . Benjamin Duranske talked about some of the ethical concerns of lawyer
participation in virtual worlds. Because a virtual worlds provider may have the ability
to review logs of attorney conversations, and other avatars may have the ability to
intercept communications, attorney-client communications in virtual worlds may not
have the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Also, issues of unauthorized
practice of law arise with the question of “where are you practicing” when a lawyer
in one jurisdiction speaks in a virtual world with a client from another jurisdiction.
Given these issues, he advises lawyers not to give advice in today’s virtual worlds.
He cautioned that if a lawyer would not say something in an email, he or she should
not say the same thing in a virtual world.
Stephen S. Wu, Real Concerns When Practicing in Virtual Worlds, ABA SCITECH LAW, Winter 2009
at 19, 24–25.
248. See Stephanie Murtagh & Jasmine M. Fisher, Compliance Considerations: Access to
Telehealth Services for Patients with Disabilities, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, July–Aug. 2021 at
5, 6–7 (2021) (discussing HIPAA waivers for telemedicine during the COVID-19 pandemic); see also
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Avatar Experimentation: Human Subjects Research in Virtual Worlds, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 695, 735 (2012) (“If a game god were to alter its EULA or TOS to include the kind of
general standardized consent to human subjects research that the ANPRM contemplates, the user
would not have a meaningful opportunity to decline. The user would have to either agree to the changed
EULA or give up all of his or her online community, property, and account progress.”); Rebecca
Crootof & BJ Ard, Structuring Techlaw, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 347, 357 (2021) (exploring range of
legal protections).
249. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103,
164.514 (2018). See generally, Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things:
Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87, 95
(2018) (“Large data volumes also enable data aggregation for purposes of sale, transfer, and
exchange.”). Although this Article was looking at the data implications outside of virtual worlds, many
of the concerns are fully applicable to these systems.
250. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. § 6802.
251. Certain corporate assets, such as databases of customer information and preferences,
are valuable only because of their confidentiality. One data breach could greatly
diminish the value of such an intangible asset. For example, the damage that a
corporate insider can generate in one episode of information theft has been, in at least
one instance, approximated to be between $50 million to $100 million. Similarly,
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Federal law provides that trade secret “means all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information,
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible . . . .”252 A trade secret requires two additional
criteria to be protected. First, “the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures
to keep such information secret;” and second, “the information derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another
person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information.”253 “Commentators universally agree that the [Uniform Trade
Secret Act’s] independent economic value requirement was intended to codify
the common law’s requirement that a trade secret give its owner a ‘competitive
advantage’ over others who do not know or use it.”254
The basic requirements of trade secret protection, therefore, require that the
virtual platform and the users of the virtual platform agree to respect the trade
secrets of their respective owners.255 Incorporating the duty to protect trade
secrets into the ToS will solve one aspect of trade secret practice focused on the
explicit duty of all parties subject to the agreement to respect bona fide trade
secrets. At the same time, however, it does raise some additional concerns.
Trade secrets, confidential information, HIPAA protected health care
records, and similar data all have the need for both legal protection from

corporate proprietary information protected solely by trade secret law could, in effect,
lose all its value in an information crime incident . . . .
See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information
Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 139–40 (2005).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (defining trade secret); see Eric R. Claeys, The Use Requirement at
Common Law and Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 583, 583–84 (2010);
see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. L. Comm’n 1985) (same).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)–(B).
254. Camilla A. Hrdy & Mark A. Lemley, Abandoning Trade Secrets, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26
(2021).
255. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 499 (2010).
The existence of secret information coupled with an express or implied
agreement of confidentiality made it easy for common law courts to impose
liability on individuals or companies who were parties to the agreement because
breach of contract and breach of trust were well-recognized wrongs. The more
difficult issue for some courts was to determine if secret information actually
existed. This led to the development of principles for differentiating between
protectable information and unprotectable information, including the concept of
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.
Id.
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unauthorized access and a pragmatic prohibition against unauthorized use.
While these concerns overlap, they are not necessarily the same. HIPAA rules,
for example, allow third parties to access protected records for payment,
treatment, and health care operations.256 Attorneys share client records with
paralegals, staff, printers, and others to the extent necessary to provide the
needed legal services.257 Ginormaverse, as the platform, will have access to any
and all information that parties share across the system. To minimize the
usability of the data by the platform, its employees, and any third parties
supporting the hardware and technology, encryption tools will be required to
restrict access and readability of the data while stored and to limit the
readability of the data to only the parties when it is being used. To the extent
technologically feasible, only the authorized users should be able to access,
decipher, read, or transfer confidential documents within Ginormaverse.
Confidential discussions and videos should not be retained after the session
unless specifically requested.258 And when any audio or video engagements are
recorded, they should only be accessible by the parties themselves. In no case
should the content be available to Ginormaverse for training or quality
assurance purposes.
The robust privacy and security requirements are one of the many reasons
that each user must be individually identified. While true anonymity may be
appropriate for select gaming, media, and perhaps adult-entertainment
activities, those activities that require credentialed access to content and
engagements will need to have a mechanism of verifying the identity for each
participant. This is relatively straight-forward to accomplish in a closed system
where the information is held in confidence by the vendor. In an interoperable
and permeable network, the use of blockchain technologies or other forms of
distributed ledger may be part of the solution.

256. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2017) (stating the regulations further limit the extent of disclosures to
the minimum necessary to carry out the requirements).
257. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information
relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third
parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other
persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject
to the lawyer’s supervision.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct/rule_1_6_confidentiality_of_information/comment_on_rule_1_6/
[https://perma.cc/KN5E-P78V].
258. Digital media are generally fixed upon creation and stored, at least temporarily, while being
transmitted in a close approximation of real time.
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E. Rights to Biometrics, Names, Images, and Likenesses
To identify a person in the real world, other people use their visual looks,
the sound of their voice, and other physical attributes. Ginormaverse will need
to acquire a limited license to use the name, image, and likeness of each user of
the system. Absent such a license, there is the potential for the virtual world to
be violating the legal protections for the customer’s biometric data259 and for
their rights of publicity.260
Capturing the biometric data regarding a person’s visual looks, voice,
fingerprints, eye-prints, or other unique identifiers is governed in some states
under biometric notification and use laws.261 By December 2021, there were
more than ten states with biometric privacy laws of various types, with
provisions that vary considerably.262 At the end of 2021, nearly two dozen states
had additional laws under consideration.263
Although the biometric data protection laws vary considerably from state
to state, they all require some level of notice to the individual before the
person’s biometric information is collected and stored.264 The Illinois Biometric

259. Molly DiRago & Troutman Pepper, The Litigation Landscape of Illinois’ Biometric
Information
Privacy
Act,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N
(Aug.
20,
2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/committees/cyber-dataprivacy/the-litigation-landscape/ [https://perma.cc/FL4W-YJSE]
Illinois was the first state to regulate the collection and storage of biometric data.
Generally, BIPA requires any private entity in possession of biometric
information to: (i) develop a written policy, (ii) inform the owner of the biometric
information in writing about the purpose for collecting the information and the
length of time it will be stored, (iii) obtain written consent for the collection and
storage of the data, and (iv) refrain from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise
profiting from that biometric information.
Id.
260. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(“[T]hat the avatars appear in the context of a video game that contains many other creative elements,
does not transform the avatars into anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing
exactly what they do as celebrities.”); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 411 for the same
proposition).
261. See Lauren Caisman, Amy de la Lama, Melissa Ruth Whigham & Bryan Cave Leighton
Paisner, U.S. Biometric Laws & Pending Legislation Tracker, JD SUPRA (May 13, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-s-biometric-laws-pending-legislation-5729436/
[https://perma.cc/5EVJ-Q6DF] (“Biometric privacy laws and regulations generally require businesses
to track, inform employees or consumers of, and provide methods for employees or consumers to
consent to, the collection of biometric information or biometric identifiers.”).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See DiRago & Pepper, supra note 259.
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Information Privacy Act (BIPA)265 became the most significant of these laws,
in part because liability could arise from violations of the law without the need
to show additional damages.266 The laws generally require some explanation of
the use to which the biometric information will be put by the enterprise
collecting the information, and the laws may include limitations on the use of
the data.267
In addition to biometric data, there are also legal restrictions on the
commercial use of a person’s name, image, and likeness.268 In a virtual world,
these may overlap with the person’s biometric data, but in other situations, these
rights will be complementary. The right to protect against the unauthorized
commercial exploitation of one’s name or likeness evolved under different
names during the nineteenth century and distilled into the law of privacy as a
result of the seminal law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis.269 Although the precise contours of the law have never been
uniformly agreed upon by the states, rights of publicity have been recognized
by the Supreme Court.270 Copyright scholar Melville Nimmer271 and Torts
expert Dean William Prosser272 each further developed the conceptual
265. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
266. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019) (“The duties imposed
on private entities by section 15 of the Act (740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 (West 2016)) regarding
the collection, retention, disclosure, and destruction of a person’s or customer’s biometric identifiers
or biometric information define the contours of that statutory right.”).
267. See DiRago & Pepper, supra note 259.
268. See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2022); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51
(McKinney 2021).
269. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890); see also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905) (the first
case to recognize the common law right of publicity in the United States); Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902) (rejecting the intermediate court’s recognition of
commercial privacy and leading to the legislative adoption of N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1905)).
270. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 580 (1977) (upholding right of
publicity claim over news station claim of First Amendment right to air an entire performance as a
human cannonball). Most recently, the Supreme Court obliquely supported rights of publicity, as
exploited by student athletes. See Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166
(2021) (“By permitting colleges and universities to offer enhanced education-related benefits, its
decision may encourage scholastic achievement and allow student-athletes a measure of compensation
more consistent with the value they bring to their schools.”).
271. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
272. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see Christine DiGregorio,
Finding A Fair Balance for the Right of Publicity and First Amendment Protections, 33 TOURO L.
REV. 995, 1000 (2017).
Prosser . . . categorized it into four distinct torts: intrusion to solitude, public
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framework even as courts were struggling to both recognize the fundamental
right and balance it against federal law’s expanding free speech jurisprudence
and copyright law.
Publicity rights grew in scope along with the power of media, increasingly
as a common law development. In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing
Gum,273 the courts clarified the scope of the increasingly important common
law right.
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the
exclusive privilege of publishing his picture . . . .
....
This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likeness, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in
newspapers, magazines, buses, trains and subways.274
As corporations have monetized the rights of their customers and social
media has created a massive new marketplace for exploitation of these rights,
each member of the public has the potential to gain economic value—or at least
to recognize an injustice when someone else exploits their name, image, or
likeness—for commercial advantage.275
The tension among rights of publicity and the associated biometric data
protections, the rights of copyright, and the rights of free speech have been
addressed in a variety of balancing tests. These include the Second Circuit’s
disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light in the public eye, and
appropriation of one’s name and likeness for the defendant’s advantage. Prosser
defined his fourth category as a “defendant making use of the name to pirate the
plaintiff’s identity for some advantage of his own;” this later became known as
the right of publicity.
Id.
273. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
274. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
275. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 227 (2012)
(“The right of publicity encompasses rights far beyond the mere collection of income and entitlement
to the economic value that flows from uses of a person’s identity. The right of publicity provides control
over the use of a person’s identity and, therefore, ultimately over the person herself.”); Jon M. Garon,
Commercializing the Digital Canvas: Renewing Rights of Attribution for Artists, Authors, and
Performers, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 837, 838–39 (2014). In contrast, other scholars are strong critics of
these rights. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Cultural and
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 178–79 (1993).
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Rogers Test,276 the California and Ninth Circuit’s Transformative Use Test,277
the Missouri Supreme Court Predominant Use Test,278 copyright preemption,279
news reporting exceptions,280 and similar limitations.281
California provides representative formulations of both the common law
and statutory rights of publicity.
The elements of a right-of-publicity claim under California
common law are: “(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of
consent; and (4) resulting injury.” The same claim under
California Civil Code § 3344 requires a plaintiff to prove “all
the elements of the common law cause of action” plus “a
knowing use by the defendant as well as a direct connection
between the alleged use and the commercial purpose.”282
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides simply that “[o]ne who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”283
Rather than focusing on the commercial exploitation of one’s name or
likeness, comment b to the Restatement suggests an even more expansive
reading:
The common form of invasion of privacy under the rule here
stated is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness to advertise the defendant’s business or product, or for
some similar commercial purpose. Apart from statute,
however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial
appropriation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of
276. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
277. Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
278. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
279. In re Jackson, 972 F.3d 25, 33 (2d Cir. 2020) (Rapper Curtis James Jackson III’s “use of
his voice on Roberts’ mixtape is preempted by the express terms of § 301 of the Copyright
Act. . . . [I]mplied preemption precludes the application of state laws to the extent that those laws
interfere with or frustrate the functioning of . . . the Copyright Act.”).
280. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (“That books, newspapers, and magazines are
published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is
safeguarded by the First Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).
281. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Kelsey B. Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First
Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443 (2015).
282. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1273 n.4
(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (2010)).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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the plaintiff’s name or likeness for his own purposes and
benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even
though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.
Statutes in some states have, however, limited the liability to
commercial uses of the name or likeness.284
Despite the California language that the rights of publicity can be exploited
“commercially or otherwise” and Restatement section 652C’s suggestion that
only state statutes limit rights of publicity to commercial activity, these are
usually (but not always) a strong demarcation. Two cases highlight what has
been commonly understood to demark the claims.
The leading case involved the nephew of matinee idol Rudolph Valentino.
Since the common law rights of publicity evolved out of privacy rights, they do
not generally survive the death of the individual.285 Nonetheless, a concurrence
by a majority of the California Supreme Court tried to make clear that rights of
publicity do not extend into communicative works.
While few courts have addressed the question of the
parameters of the right of publicity in the context of expressive
activities, their response has been consistent. Whether the
publication involved was factual and biographical or fictional,
the right of publicity has not been held to outweigh the value
of free expression. Any other conclusion would allow reports
and commentaries on the thoughts and conduct of public and
prominent persons to be subject to censorship under the guise
of preventing the dissipation of the publicity value of a
person’s identity. Moreover, the creation of historical novels
and other works inspired by actual events and people would be
off limits to the fictional author. An important avenue of selfexpression would be blocked and the marketplace of ideas
would be diminished.286
The California Supreme Court made very clear in 1979 that the First
Amendment concerns at the heart of limitations to common law defamation and
privacy applied with equal vigor to claims for the rights of publicity. The
concurrence also rejected an attempt to interject the inapplicable “actual
malice” standard,287 instead recognizing the need for adaptation and storytelling using fictionalized accounts would make the use of the actual malice

284. Id. at cmt. b.
285. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979); Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (1979).
286. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 461–62 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
287. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964) (holding the speech of public
figures is subject to actual malice standard).
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standard more confounding than helpful.288 Although the concurrence was
largely dicta, it demonstrated a clear distinction between communicative works
of fact and fiction for which there were no publicity rights and the commercial
products, ads, and endorsements for which there would continue to be
protection from commercial appropriation.
The Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod. Court also distinguished the
rather unique theft involved in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. The
Supreme Court relied on state law protection for “the ‘right to the publicity
value of his performance,’ the right to control its commercial display and
exploitation.”289 Unlike a name or likeness misappropriation, the value of a
person’s performance may well be protected by statute or common law. It may
even be an implicit extension of the right of publicity, but it is also an economic
right about taking the value of another’s work without authorization. At the
heart of Zacchini is the same economic theft that is central to the core of rights
of publicity actions, and which is distinct from free speech uses where a
person’s true or fictionalized story is incorporated into a story being told by a
third party.
These themes have been repeated in later California case law. In Sarver v.
Chartier,290 the Ninth Circuit rejected a former army sergeant’s claim that he
had been falsely portrayed in the movie The Hurt Locker.291 He had not
consented or licensed his publicity rights to the producers.292 Dismissing all his
claims under the California anti-SLAPP statute,293 the court noted “The Hurt
Locker is not speech proposing a commercial transaction.”294 Following
Guglielmi, the court rejected all claims. Nearly a decade later, Olivia De
Havilland brought a similar set of complaints for a portrayal she considered

288. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (holding privacy claims, though nondefamatory, remain subject to actual malice standard); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
56 (1988) (holding actual malice standard is used for intentional parody).
289. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 464 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad, 433 U.S. 562, 565
(1977)). In Zacchini, the live performance of the Human Cannon Ball was filmed and aired in its
entirety on a segment of the local news, having the potential to reduce greatly the public's interested in
attending the event as live spectators. See generally Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). This was a
commercial harm, according to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding that it was committed in the form
of a media broadcast. Id. at 580.
290. 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016).
291. Id. at 896, 907.
292. Id. at 896.
293. Under California law, plaintiffs attempting to assert claims that might be barred by First
Amendment protections must first prove the lawsuit is not intended to deter speech under the antiSLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) laws. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1)
(West 2022).
294. Sarver, 813 F.3d at 905.
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unflattering.295 “The 101-year-old actress sued . . . claiming the series Feud:
Bette and Joan makes her seem like a vulgar hypocrite and gossip.”296 The court
again rejected such claims.
Books, films, and television shows are “things” but are they
“merchandise” or “products”?
....
Feud is as constitutionally protected as was the film in Sarver,
The Hurt Locker. As with that expressive work, Feud “is
speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment, which
safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw
materials of life—including the stories of real individuals,
ordinary or extraordinary—and transform them into art, be it
articles, books, movies, or plays.297
These cases suggest a clear line between communicative works such as
articles, books, movies, or plays entitled to First Amendment protection on one
hand, and the advertisements, tchotchkes, and endorsements on the other.298
The problem for Ginormaverse and video games more generally is that despite
an unequivocal statement by the Supreme Court that video games are entitled
to full First Amendment protection,299 courts have been reluctant to see video
games with the same level of free speech interests as books, movies, and
plays.300 Rather than simply finding these works to be categorically
communicative, the courts have applied a balancing test.
In recent cases involving student athletes, courts found that the accurate
reproduction of a virtual sports environment resulted in an unauthorized use of
295. De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
296. Ashley Cullins, FX Wins Appellate Court “Feud” With Olivia de Havilland, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/fx-wins-appellatecourt-feud-olivia-de-havilland-1097518/ [https://perma.cc/Z9CY-2X63].
297. De Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636, 638.
298. Id. at 636.
Many of the cases in this area involve products and merchandise such as T-shirts
and lithographs [Prod. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)], greeting
cards [Hilton v. Hallmark Cards 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010)], and video games
[Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015]; [In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013)]; [Kirby v. Sega of Am.,
Inc. 144 Cal.App.4th 47, (2006)], or advertisements for products and
merchandise. [See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co. 157 F.3d 686, 691-694
(9th Cir. 1998) [beer advertisement]; [Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1992)] [advertisement for SalsaRio Doritos]; Midler v. Ford Motor Co.
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) [advertisement for Ford Lincoln Mercury] . . . .
Id.
299. Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011).
300. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 144–49 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013).
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the athlete’s name or likeness.301 These courts struggled with the use of a
transformative test, but neither court asked why a video game author would
require greater rights than a broadcaster, newspaper, or filmmaker.302
The distinction will become critical to the way in which Ginormaverse
looks to draft its ToS. The metaverse platform will undoubtedly require express
permission of anyone seeking to create an avatar within the system. But this
will not be enough. There will be events held within the system importing
content from other news and media resources. Even if courts are eventually
going to recognize that a press conference played in Ginormaverse should
require no publicity rights, just as no television, radio, or print service requires
these rights, the difference in treatment could lead to costly litigation and
confusion.
In addition, if the law requires Ginormaverse to have expansive authority
for use of publicity rights, then the contractual grant will be much broader.
From a consumer protection standard, the goal would be to have the platform
obtain only minimal rights, with the individual retaining all rights for
exploitation of one’s name, image, and likeness when used to actually endorse
products or services, to sell goods, or to otherwise commercialize one’s
publicity rights. An actor or athlete will need to give the platform permission
to recreate their image in order for that person to have an accurate avatar within
the metaverse. But that initial grant should not include the right to sublicense it
to other entities for purposes of commercialization. The ToS should be
appropriately limited in scope.
The better understanding is that the use of one’s name, image, or likeness
within the metaverse is not an exploitation of publicity rights. Avatars
presenting the news can use the names of individuals in their stories in precisely
the same manner as can other news presenters. Storytellers can name-check
celebrities in in-world content to the extent they can do so in current media.
In contrast, when a person or enterprise uses a person’s name, image, or
likeness to endorse a product or service, to create an advertisement, or to
otherwise attempt to sell any goods or services, in that instance, the individual
rights of publicity must be obtained as a condition of the usage. For example,
assume a famous actor can be seen in a virtual world having coffee while sitting
in an open plaza. That should not require any rights of publicity. If the public
can walk up to that actor and ask her for store recommendations, then those
endorsements should only be permitted if the actor has given permission in
advance. If the public can link from the purse, shoes, or clothing on the avatar

301. See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1284.
302. E.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 169; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1284.
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to a store selling those items, then again, the vendors should be required to
obtain express permission. The recommendations and endorsements transform
the avatar’s use into a commercial exploitation of the avatar owner’s likeness.
These uses of a person’s name, image, and likeness are commercial in nature.
In addition to the rights of publicity, the FTC creates affirmative duties for
product endorsements.303 In 2021, the FTC significantly stepped up its
enforcement against false endorsements, fake reviews, and similar consumer
deceptions.304 There is a commensurate harm to anyone who can provide
endorsements for goods or services but finds that fake reports undermine the
public value in those endorsements. As such, rights of publicity must be
carefully protected in all instances where an actual endorsement is taking place,
while providing traditional First Amendment protections when these
commercial interests are not present.
F. Free Speech and ToS Restrictive Conditions
A related area has also received considerable attention. The commercial
marketplace is strongly benefitted from truthful disclosure of information
regarding products and services.305 The Supreme Court has often recognized
“the consumers’ interest in the receipt of accurate information in the
commercial market by prohibiting fraudulent and misleading advertising.”306
Given this fundamental public interest in accurate consumer information, it is
unsurprising that there are ongoing concerns about efforts to include restrictions

303. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45; Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2021).
304. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Puts Hundreds of Businesses on Notice about Fake Reviews
and Other Misleading Endorsements (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2021/10/ftc-puts-hundreds-businesses-notice-about-fake-reviews-other
[https://perma.cc/HG3L-XGVG]
The rise of social media has blurred the line between authentic content and
advertising, leading to an explosion in deceptive endorsements across the
marketplace. Fake online reviews and other deceptive endorsements often tout
products throughout the online world. Consequently, the FTC is now using its
Penalty Offense Authority to remind advertisers of the law and deter them from
breaking it. By sending a Notice of Penalty Offenses to more than 700 companies,
the agency is placing them on notice they could incur significant civil penalties—
up to $43,792 per violation—if they use endorsements in ways that run counter
to prior FTC administrative cases.
Id.
305. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769–70
(1976); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552,
577–78 (2011).
306. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 496.
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on truthful product and service reviews in licensing agreements.307 In 2021, a
new association, Transparency in Cybersecurity, was formed to address
contractual restrictions addressing general product assessments as well as
identifying cybersecurity threats.308 Transparency in Cybersecurity launched
with a review of 200 EULAs. “Of this sampling, 42% of companies had clauses
that in some fashion prohibit users from publicly disclosing assessments of their
products. Public companies tended to be less transparent, with 53% featuring
restrictions in their EULAs, compared to just 39% of private companies.”309
The concern about contractual limits on truthful product information has
been a concern since the shift to licensed software and goods expanded in the
modern internet age.
[Restrictive] clickwrap agreements, if upheld, violate the
consumer’s fundamental, rather than economic, rights. For
example, a number of such agreements require users to waive
their free speech rights by prohibiting them from engaging in
public criticism of the developing company or its products,
publishing benchmark results (an objective measure of a
program’s
performance
across
differing
hardware
configuration), or even reviews.310
Although the concern over the public’s right to truthful product information
is not new, the potential for a monopolistic or oligopolistic ToS used to cover a
person’s entire professional and social life has far more sweeping effects than
a similar provision in just a computer operating system or commercial website.
To the extent Ginormaverse’s ToS becomes universal, it serves to supplant
positive law under an increasingly misplaced freedom to contract principle.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT: WARRANT REQUIREMENTS, THIRD
PARTY DOCTRINE, AND THE POWER OF SUBPOENAS
Another area that may be significantly impacted by a universal metaverse
is the extent to which personal privacy services are protected against

307. See Bradley Barth, Silenced? Transparency Effort Looks to Squash Vendor Restrictions on
Product Reviews by Users, SC MEDIA (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.scmagazine.com/feature/policy/
silenced-transparency-effort-looks-to-squash-vendor-restrictions-on-product-reviews-by-users
[https://perma.cc/L22Y-6MJQ].
308. Id.
309. Id.; see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night:
Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 497
(2004); David R. Collins, Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap, and Other Software License Agreements: Litigating
a Digital Pig in a Poke in West Virginia, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 550 (2009).
310. Collins, supra note 309, at 550.
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unwarranted government intrusions.311 The government has always sought
private information regarding suspected criminals as part of its law enforcement
strategies, but with the “terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the impetus for
the government to gather personal information has greatly increased.”312 Data
has become an essential element in the war on terror.313 As society has learned
with the recent pandemic, data is also an essential element in the delivery of
public health.314 Some view this issue as an important civil rights and social
justice issue315 while others frame it in the civil liberties context.316 The
continuing publicity surrounding government officials’ use of contact tracing
and health outcomes highlights the significance of personal information and
behavioral data. These data go well beyond one’s personally identifiable
information to include all aspects of an individual’s activities, interactions,
attitudes, and preferences.
The government is not necessarily just Big Brother. Although there are
concerns about overwhelming access to personal information fueling a
totalitarian state,317 there are a myriad of smaller concerns about local law
enforcement, municipal services, and voter manipulation that could all create
social concerns if the government has unbridled access to individual and
collective private information.
In the context of cell phones and vehicle tracking, the Supreme Court has
adopted a series of significant decisions in favor of individual privacy.318 These
311. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).
312. Id. at 1084.
313. Id.
314. See Public Health, Surveillance, and Human Rights Network. Surveillance and the “New
Normal” of Covid-19: Public Health, Data, and Justice. New York, SOC. SCI. RSCH. COUNS. (2021)
https://covid19research.ssrc.org/public-health-surveillance-and-human-rights-network/report/
[https://perma.cc/N5PM-C2NJ].
315. See Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to
Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 804–05 (2020).
316. See Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and Public Health:
Talking Point on Public Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REPS., no.
12, 2007, at 1099 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2267241/ [https://perma.cc/ZW57NH37].
317. Solove, supra note 311, at 1804–85 (“Inadequately constrained government informationgathering can lead to at least three types of harms. First, it can result in the slow creep toward a
totalitarian state. Second, it can chill democratic activities and interfere with individual selfdetermination. Third, it can lead to the danger of harms arising in bureaucratic settings.”).
318. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (warrant was required when police
placed tracking device on suspect’s car); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 387 (2014) (the “immense
storage capacity” of cell phones require that police obtain a warrant before conducting a general search
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changes, however, have been incremental in nature and may not keep pace with
the public’s shift away from personal records to data stored by third parties and
managed outside the control by most citizens. As the metaverse further
accelerates the use of cloud-based data storage and increases the location of
proprietary information outside the home, statutory and constitutional
protections against government collection and misuse of data become
increasingly important.
The Fourth Amendment applies to protect an individual from an
unauthorized search and seizure of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”319
“The Fourth Amendment strikes a balance between liberty and social order—
two concepts which stand on opposite sides of an ideological teeter-totter.”320
The Supreme Court has had to reconcile this balance as technology has evolved.
Nearly a century ago, in Olmstead v. United States,321 the Court faced the
intrusion of the modern age of telephones, radios, and wired communications.
The Court refused to extend to telegraph and telephone messages the
protections afforded to the mail because the mail service was a government
monopoly.322
Under this logic, outside the home, the Fourth Amendment only extended
to the government’s monopolistic control over one’s communications.
Information in the private sphere was not subject to any extension of the Fourth
Amendment. Unlike “the unlawful rifling by a government agent of a sealed
letter,” the telephone wires were not under government control.323 As such,
“[t]here was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by
the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants.”324

in the contents of a phone); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (requiring a
warrant for a search of cell-site location information (CSLI)).
319. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (The “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”).
320. Tricia A. Martino, Fear of Change: Carpenter v. United States and Third-Party Doctrine,
58 DUQ. L. REV. 353, 356 (2020); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the
Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 324–25 (2002).
321. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 464–65.
324. Id. at 464.
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Olmstead was eventually rejected by statute325 and later overturned by
Berger v. State of New York326 and Katz v. United States.327 Significantly, Katz
rejected Olmstead’s limited view of the Fourth Amendment.328 The Court
extended Fourth Amendment protections beyond places to people.329 As part of
this expansion, the Court reframed the Fourth Amendment as protecting an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.330 As the Court recently
summarized, “[w]hen an individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’
and his expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable,’ we have held that official intrusion into that private sphere
generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable
cause.”331
Over time, the list of activities protected by the warrant requirement has
been expanded. In 2014, the Court used traditional trespass doctrine to find that
sneaking onto a person’s driveway without a warrant to place a GPS tracking
device constituted an unwarranted, unlawful search.332 Justice Sotomayor, in
concurrence, suggested that the real threat is the extended, low-cost volume of
information that can be made subject to government search. As she explained,
“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so
on.”333 The Court took those concerns seriously. Two years later, the Supreme
Court recognized that the significant amount of personal information on a
person’s cell phone requires that a cell phone be protected by a search warrant
requirement, even when seized as part of a lawful arrest.334 In the third Supreme

325. See GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF
FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 2 (2012) (“By
the time of the landmark Supreme Court decision in Olmstead, however, at least forty-one of the fortyeight states had banned wiretapping or forbidden telephone and telegraph employees and officers from
disclosing the content of telephone or telegraph messages or both.”).
326. 388 U.S. 41, 63–64 (1967).
327. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
328. Id. at 353.
329. Id. at 351 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).
330. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from
prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”).
331. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
332. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
333. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
334. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 387 (2014).
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Court decision on technology searches, the Court again required a search
warrant. In this case, it was for cell site location information (CLSI).335
Although the Supreme Court decided that the request for CLSI required a
warrant, it tried to provide very incremental guidance regarding the warrant
requirements for searches of third party records.336 The doctrinal challenge is
that, historically, records held by third parties did not require a search warrant,
and as a result, the government could obtain financial records, repair records,
purchase histories, and many other forms of behavioral records without any
need to establish probable cause or specify with particularity the items to be
searched.337
In an important pair of decisions during the 1970s, the Supreme Court
created the third-party doctrine.338 The doctrine developed in the context of a
tax evasion case, where “the Government subpoenaed [defendant Mitch
Miller’s financial records to show his income from an unlicensed still,] seeking
several months of canceled checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements.”339
There, at least some of the records were “not confidential communications but
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”340 Other
records, however, were turned over to the bank for the purpose of the bank’s
use on behalf of the defendant, but they were still records out of the defendant’s

335. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 at 2211–12.
Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record
known as cell-site location information (CSLI). The precision of this information
depends on the size of the geographic area covered by the cell site. . . .
Wireless carriers collect and store CSLI for their own business purposes,
including finding weak spots in their network and applying “roaming” charges
when another carrier routes data through their cell sites. . . . [I]n recent years
phone companies have also collected location information from the transmission
of text messages and routine data connections. Accordingly, modern cell phones
generate increasingly vast amounts of increasingly precise CSLI.
Id.
336. Id. at 2214–15 (“This sort of digital data—personal location information maintained by a
third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents. Instead, requests for cell-site records lie at
the intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of the privacy interests
at stake.”).
337. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that warrants
shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing
is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”).
338. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (ruling that the government obtainment
of bank records was not a Fourth Amendment search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46
(1979) (ruling that the government’s use of a pen register was not a Fourth Amendment search).
339. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 438, 442).
340. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
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control.341 The Court did not see a difference between records provided to the
public and records intended to be treated confidentially between the parties.342
“The Court thus concluded that Miller had ‘take[n] the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that person to
the Government.’ ”343
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court expanded the third-party doctrine to all
records, without regard to the party’s knowledge that the records were being
kept or the purpose to which they were being put.344 The Court permitted the
“pen register” information providing telephone records regarding who was
making phone calls into and out of various telephone numbers.345 Although the
government would be required to have a warrant to listen into the calls, it could
obtain the records from the phone company with a simple subpoena.346
In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggested that the thirdparty doctrine might be inappropriate for the modern era of historical data
searches and ubiquitous tracking. “[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” she explained.347 “This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.”348
Without addressing the continuing application of the third-party doctrine in
established cases, Carpenter declined to extend the third-party doctrine to CSLI
searches.349 At the same time, however, the decision was intended to be narrow
and incremental.
Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a
view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or “tower
dumps” (a download of information on all the devices that
connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).
We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call
into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools,
such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business
records that might incidentally reveal location information.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 435.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979).
Id. at 745–46.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
Id.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
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Further, our opinion does not consider other collection
techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. As
Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations in
airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such
cases, to ensure that we do not “embarrass the future.”350
As 5G expands bandwidth, the potential for virtual and augmented reality
to become mobile adds another dimension to the regulation of the metaverse.
Lower courts have split on the issue of whether tower dumps require
warrants.351 If online worlds include GPS or other location data in the way
Ingress and Pokémon Go take advantage of location information, then law
enforcement (and civil litigators) will have a significant new tool to track the
public’s movement.
Beyond the physical intrusion into one’s home or one’s movements,
however, the law continues to embrace the third-party doctrine enthusiastically.
“Investigators have a handful of tools to compel the disclosure of electronic
data, and a subpoena is the easiest to obtain because the government is not
required to provide cause for obtaining the information. Subpoenas don’t
require a judge to issue them.”352
Since the Fourth Amendment does not provide a warrant requirement for
most third-party records, Congress passed federal legislation to supplement the
constitutional right. Shortly after Katz extended Fourth Amendment
protections, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.353 Title III of the statute is known as the “Wiretap Act,” which has
been subsequently expanded to also include the Stored Communications Act.354
The Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of both oral and wire
communications, but also provides a mechanism for seeking a court order to
issue a wiretap or electronic surveillance.355

350. Id. at 2220 (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)).
351. See ANNE TOOMEY MCKENNA & CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING § 28:8 (2021); In re Cell Tower Records Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D), 90 F. Supp. 3d
673, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2015); Matter of Search of Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 481 F.
Supp. 3d 730, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2020); United States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2762 (2019).
352. Jay Greene, Tech Giants Have to Hand Over your Data When Federal Investigators Ask.
Here’s Why, WASH. POST (June 15, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2021/06/15/faq-data-subpoena-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/4WP7-TKNW].
353. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510).
354. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12.
355. Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act), U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST.:BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civilliberties/authorities/statutes/1284 [https://perma.cc/5E4E-D7AM].
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The architecture of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) is based on 1986
legislation and has evolved from an understanding of how email
communications are transferred and stored.356 As a result, the SCA covers
“remote computing services” (RCS), which were third-party data processing
centers and providers or electronic communications services (ECS), which
were precursors to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that sent and received
customer information such as emails.357 Over time, as the service providers
integrated the functions, the distinction between ECS and RCS focused on the
status of the record being sought by the government rather than the contractual
relationship between the customer and the service.
ECS includes live communications, digital wiretaps, and files such as
unopened emails. Under the SCA, any file that falls into this category requires
a traditional search warrant to be accessed by the government, unless the access
is available to it under an exception to the search warrant requirement.358
One possible exception to the search warrant requirement is consent. The
customer’s consent may be circuitous. An ISP may prohibit illegal content such
as gambling, drug sales, child pornography, or obscenity from being stored
within the ISP’s system. The ISP may further reserve the right to disclose such
materials that are illegal and in violation of the ISP’s terms of service.359 Under
such a ToS, the result would be that the customer has essentially consented to
the ISP turning over the incriminating, illegal files directly to law
enforcement.360 The potential for law enforcement is significant, particularly if
356. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1213 (2004).
357. Id. at 1214.
358. See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Criminal Defendant’s Rights Under Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 et seq., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 § 2 (2016) (“A warrant
‘issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a
State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction’ is required to
obtain content from an ECS in electronic storage for 180 days or less.”).
359. See, e.g., Laurie Sullivan, Google To Scan Files In Its Cloud Services For Illegal, Harmful
Content, MEDIAPOST (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/369579/
google-to-scan-files-in-its-cloud-services-for-ill.html [https://perma.cc/N5PY-TSG2] (“A Google
policy . . . focuses on Google’s drive cloud-storage service, restricting access to files that violate
company guidelines and terms of use. Google, using algorithms that scan the content, will keep a closer
eye on harmful content ranging from cybercrime offenses to the protection of copyright law and child
sexual abuse.”).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Kovacs, No. 3:20-CR-51, 2021 WL 3562920, at *8 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 11, 2021) (“Dropbox initially sent a complaint into NCMEC regarding Defendant’s activities in
2017, MeWe’s September 2019 report—stating that Defendant’s IP address was being used to log into
a MeWe account containing suspected child pornography—provides a temporal reference to the illegal
activity at the time the search warrant issued.”); Dylan Carroll, Child Pornography Statutes and the
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the government is both providing contracts to major metaverse enterprises and
asking those enterprises to have expansive rights to protect the public under the
ToS.
For stored communications, the government also has the ability to obtain
records with something less than a search warrant. A subpoena is sufficient to
obtain “(A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone
connection records . . . (D) length of service (including start date) and types of
service utilized; (E) . . . subscriber number or identity . . . and (F) means and
source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account
number) . . . .”361 Although there are additional steps between a subpoena and
the transactional logs, the bulk of customer records can be obtained using what
is known as a 2703(d) court order. Here, the judge or magistrate can issue an
order to provide records, so long as the government has established “specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”362
The specificity of the 2703(d) order is substantially less than that of a search
warrant but still stronger than a mere subpoena. These orders collect a great
deal of data.
In the cases that have been determined thus far, courts have
concluded that applications for an e-mail or a text message,
posting to social networking service; cell site location
information, generally; and historical or prospective cell site
location data have all met the “specific and articulable facts”
standard. Most court have found that requests for subscriber
record or information met the standard, but one court found the
application to be deficient in the case before it.363

Cloud: Updating Judicial Interpretations for New Technologies, 57 HOUS. L. Rev. 727, 736 n.36
(2020) (“[C]ompanies like Dropbox actively work with law enforcement to find and expose users who
use the service for possession of child pornography.”) (citing Kate Knibbs, Dropbox Refuses to Explain
Its Mysterious Child Porn Detection Software, GIZMODO (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://gizmodo.com/dropbox-refuses-to-explain-its-mysterious-child-porn-de-1722573363
[https://perma.cc/HH8A-GWGG] (“Looking at its Terms of Service, Dropbox states that it can search
through your files to see if they comply with its ToS and Acceptable Use Policy. The company can
look for way more than just vile child exploitation images—it can search for hate speech, any illegal
porn, and anything that infringes on someone else’s privacy.”)).
361. H. MARSHALL JARRETT, MICHAEL W. BAILIE, ED HAGEN & NATHAN JUDISH, SEARCHING
AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
128 (2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)).
362. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d); see Catalano, supra note 358, at 11.
363. Catalano, supra note 358, at 14 (collecting cases).
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The broad scope of the 2703(d) court orders and the ability to expand
further in situations where the ToS grants the ISP rights to review stored records
will create the potential to undermine public protection from government
surveillance. These fears will undoubtedly reinforce the efforts of DAO
organizers to promote decentralized metaverse systems that add friction to easy
governmental surveillance. These concerns may be even greater in other
jurisdictions where restrictions on government access to personal information
are subject to even less protection.
Concerns over privacy protections from the government will lead to some
architectural choices in the metaverse. Privacy advocates will certainly promote
use of encryption technologies that reduce the ability of ISPs and other third
parties from accessing user information. Privacy, data security, and bandwidth
considerations all suggest that the metaverse architecture leans more heavily on
local storage and processing power. This approach will make the individual’s
smart cell phone an even more important part of their user experience, but the
aggregate storage and processing power could significantly benefit the
exploitation of the technologies. Phones with peripherals (such as keyboards,
monitors, and remote printing) could finally eliminate the duplicative capacity
of laptops and desktops, furthering a consolidation into metaverse technologies.
The movement into the metaverse could also trigger further expansion of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into the virtual space. The Supreme Court
has demonstrated its reluctance to rely on the third-party doctrine in ways that
ignore the practical changes technology have had on the public’s lifestyles.
Perhaps, as the metaverse becomes widely adopted, the Court will recognize
that a virtual home is as much as a castle as a house made out of brick and
mortar, providing the same level of protection that the Court has already
extended to the smartphone. If the Supreme Court someday recognizes the
centrality of the metaverse, then the era of Web3 and the metaverse will have
truly arrived.
VII. CONCLUSION
Some version of the metaverse is inevitable. The growth of Roblox,
popularity of Bitmoji, and a generation of online worlds have intersected with
the economic clout of cryptocurrencies and the potential of nonfungible tokens
to usher in a new set of use cases that will evolve to make Web3 as profoundly
different from the current internet as the current environment is different from
America Online and the early internet portals. Even in the domestic
marketplace, the nature of new transactions will trigger a wave of updated
regulation, business model innovation, and wealth transfer that will leave many
wondering how we got here.
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Fortunately, the fundamentals for business have not changed. Relationships
are governed by contract law, and contract law is interpreted through a
longstanding common law tradition. Securities laws and antitrust
considerations have been raised in each generation where new business models
have sought to upend the historical way of doing business. Lessons from the
Web 2.0 experience will likely leave both consumers and regulators of startups to seek safe harbors intended to let the new companies develop. Those Web
2.0 companies have grown to dominate the global economy, and the public
appetite for sweetheart deals has likely passed.
The leaders of the Web3 movement are decidedly focused on reclaiming
the property rights lost to Web 2.0. Using NFTs to enforce property and direct
user control to discourage corporate overreach, the Web3 movement has the
potential to rectify the imbalances of the past. At the moment, many of the
promises may be loose predictions, but hopefully, this roadmap will help those
building, investing, and regulating in these future technologies see where an
optimal mix of private contracting, innovation, and government regulation.
Since the movement will bring even more of our daily lives onto the internet,
courts and regulators must also anticipate how that will affect our constitutional
rights and civil liberties.
Two things are certain. First, this future that is already here will look quite
different in the decades to come. Second, the metaverse will be much more than
just a game. The rest has yet to be written.

